LOUISVILLE METRO COUNCIL COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 1 LOUISVILLE METRO GOVERNMENT 2 JEFFERSON COUNTY 3 4 5 6 7 IN THE MATTER OF CHARGES AGAINST DISTRICT 21 COUNCILMAN DAN JOHNSON 8 9 10 11 REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 12 13 Transcript of November 1, 2017, Hearing before Chairman David Yates at City Hall, 601 West 14 15 Jefferson Street, Third Floor, Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky. 16 17 18 19 20 21 LAURA J. KOGUT, RMR, CRR, CRC McLendon-Kogut Reporting Service, LLC 22 Anchorage Office Plaza 2525 Nelson Miller Parkway, Suite 204 Louisville, Kentucky 40223 23 (502) 585-5634 24 lkogut@mclendon-kogut.com www.mclendon-kogut.com 25

## CONTENTS

2

1

_		
3	Appearances	<u>Page</u> 3
4	Call to order	4
5	Roll call	4
6	Preliminary Matters	6
7	Introduction of Chairman Yates	26
8		20
9	GLI and Kent Oyler's Motion to Quash Subpoena Issued to Kent Oyler	26
10	GLI Motion for Protective Order	42
11	Charging Committee Motion for Summary Disposition	50
12		30
13	Charging Committee Withdrawal of Motion for Summary Disposition	72
14	Council Member Questions	72
15	Respondent Motion for Censure and Dismissal of Removal Proceedings	76
16	Motion for closed session	8 9
17		
18	Motion to end executive session	90
19	Reading of Stipulation and Agreed Order	90
20	Discussion of Stipulation and Agreed Order	94
21	Vote on Stipulation and Agreed Order	123
22	Adjournment	124
	Notary Certificate	125
23		
24		
25	* * *	

1	APPEARANCES
2	
3	COUNSEL FOR CHARGING COMMITTEE: Ms. Deborah K. Kent
4	Deborah Kent Law Office 120 Sears Avenue, Suite 211
5	Louisville, Kentucky 40207-5072 (502) 712-9988
6	dkent@twc.com
7	and
8	Mr. Christophe G. Stewart Stewart Law Office
9	120 Sears Avenue, Suite 211 Louisville, Kentucky 40207-5072
10	(502) 419-7983 cgstew94@gmail.com
11	COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT:
12	Mr. Thomas A. McAdam, III 2950 Breckenridge Lane, Suite 9
13	Louisville, Kentucky 40220-1462 (502) 584-7255
14	thomas@mcadam.com
15	COUNSEL TO COUNCIL COURT: Mr. Matthew Golden
16	Jefferson County Attorney's Office 531 Court Place, Suite 900
17	Louisville, Kentucky 40202 (502) 574-6336
18	METRO COUNCIL CLERK:
19	Mr. H. Stephen Ott 601 West Jefferson Street
20	Louisville, Kentucky 40202 (502) 574-3902
21	Stephen.Ott@louisvilleky.gov
22	
23	* * *
24	
25	

1	(Hearing commenced at 1:13 p.m.)
2	CHAIRMAN YATES: The Louisville Metro Council
3	Court of November 1st, 2017, will please come to
4	order.
5	Mr. Clerk.
6	Where is Mr. Clerk?
7	Mr. Clerk.
8	MR. OTT: I'm sorry about that.
9	CHAIRMAN YATES: A roll call, please.
10	MR. OTT: Council Member Shanklin.
11	COUNCIL MEMBER SHANKLIN: Present.
12	MR. OTT: Council Member Woolridge.
13	COUNCIL MEMBER WOOLRIDGE: Present.
14	MR. OTT: Council Member Sexton Smith.
15	COUNCIL MEMBER SEXTON SMITH: Present.
16	MR. OTT: Council Member Bryant Hamilton.
17	COUNCIL MEMBER BRYANT HAMILTON: Here.
18	MR. OTT: Council Member James.
19	COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Here.
20	MR. OTT: Council Member Hollander.
21	COUNCIL MEMBER HOLLANDER: Here.
22	MR. OTT: Council Member Mulvihill.
23	COUNCIL MEMBER MULVIHILL: Here.
24	MR. OTT: Council Member Kramer.
25	COUNCIL MEMBER KRAMER: Here.

1	MR. OTT: Council Member Aubrey Welch.	
2	COUNCIL MEMBER AUBREY WELCH: Here.	
3	MR. OTT: Council Member Fowler.	
4	COUNCIL MEMBER FOWLER: Here.	
5	MR. OTT: Council Member Butler.	
6	COUNCIL MEMBER BUTLER: Here.	
7	MR. OTT: Council Member Reed.	
8	COUNCIL MEMBER REED: Here.	
9	MR. OTT: Council Member Stuckel.	
10	COUNCIL MEMBER STUCKEL: Here.	
11	MR. OTT: Council Member Parker.	
12	COUNCIL MEMBER PARKER: Here.	
13	MR. OTT: Council Member Denton.	
14	Council Member Benson.	
15	COUNCIL MEMBER BENSON: Present.	
16	MR. OTT: Council Member Peden.	
17	COUNCIL MEMBER PEDEN: Here.	
18	MR. OTT: Council Member Flood.	
19	President Yates.	
20	CHAIRMAN YATES: Present.	
21	MR. OTT: Council Member Ackerson.	
22	COUNCIL MEMBER ACKERSON: Here.	
23	MR. OTT: Council Member Denton.	
24	Council Member Flood.	
25	Mr. President, you have 18 in attendance and	

a quorum.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Thank you, Mr. Clerk.

Would you please cause the record to reflect that Councilwoman Flood has provided compelling reasons for her absence and has been provided an excuse from the Council Court for her service.

MR. OTT: So noted.

CHAIRMAN YATES: I'm sorry. Was there a question on it?

COUNCIL MEMBER ACKERSON: Yeah. Did you say excused from the Council Court altogether?

CHAIRMAN YATES: She is. She has provided in confidentiality a compelling reason. There has been no objection from either counsel. We have -- we have discussed and she has been excused from Council Court due to personal issues.

COUNCIL MEMBER ACKERSON: Okay. And I guess at some point someone will explain how that affects the numbers and the vote and everything else, I presume?

CHAIRMAN YATES: It can be. And if the

County -- if the Assistant County Attorney would

like to do so shortly. Let me do introductions.

And right now it will be the entire sitting body.

So in the event that one member could not sit for

either excuse or any other reason, then it would be the remainder of the -- the percentage of the remainder of the sitting body.

Okay. And I've also requested an excused absence just for today from Councilwoman Denton.

Any members know that in the event that you miss any part of a proceeding, you shall make up that in its entirety through watching it on the video, and you will be required to sign an acknowledgment under testimony, under the penalty of perjury, that you have done so.

With that being said --

COUNCIL MEMBER SHANKLIN: Mr. President, I want to know why --

MR. OTT: You need to put your mike on.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And let me ask, just as we move on, because people for -- we have to get a transcript, so I'm going to ask no one speak unless you put in your queue, click on it, then I'll call. Throughout this we'll have certain times to have breaks, but we won't be interrupting throughout it, but I -- Councilwoman Barbara Shanklin, just because I acknowledged you before I got started, you can go ahead and --

COUNCIL MEMBER SHANKLIN: I'm in the queue.

CHAIRMAN YATES: It's --

COUNCIL MEMBER SHANKLIN: You probably didn't look.

CHAIRMAN YATES: I think it's -- may not be on. It's not on. So maybe you gotta click on the floor and then click in the queue.

COUNCIL MEMBER SHANKLIN: I just want to -CHAIRMAN YATES: If the clerk would help her
with that, please.

COUNCIL MEMBER SHANKLIN: I just want to know why -- if we decided we didn't want to be involved, can we not, since you allowed Madonna Flood not to be involved?

CHAIRMAN YATES: Councilwoman, in the event that -- just like any juror in any case, there will be some times that there may be a family emergency or some reason that you would have a compelling reason that would be presented to the Chair and to counsel.

In this particular case, without getting into her personal facts, this is a situation that rose to such a level that I felt that it was necessary to excuse her, and neither counsel for the Respondent or the Charging Committee objected, and they all agreed.

COUNCIL MEMBER SHANKLIN: Well, okay. I'll see about getting excused too.

MS. KENT: Mr. Chair, for the record, if I could just say, the Charging Committee did not object but asked if that final decision could be delayed until late tonight or tomorrow in case that situation changed, but the expectation was there would be no change in her situation.

MR. MCADAM: And on behalf of the Respondent, we didn't object to Mrs. Flood not attending because of her family emergency, but we reserve the right to argue about how that affects the vote total, how many votes it takes to retain and how many votes it takes to remove. It does affect the total, and we may eventually want to argue that this hearing cannot go forward if we don't have an adequate Council Court as established by state law.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And I didn't take either waiver from either party, or nonobjection from a -- to say that you are waiving an argument over the proceeding.

In this situation, the counsel for the Charging Committee did make that statement that asked, but in the decision of the Chair, after discussion with the councilwoman, I made the

decision that she shall be excused and she can deal with those without the worry of this proceeding. I think it rose to that level.

Councilman Ackerson.

COUNCIL MEMBER ACKERSON: Thank you, Mr. President.

Also when we're talking about attendance -no offense to Mr. Golden, fine lawyer, but two times
before we've had a hearing here, those two times
women were before us on removal proceedings, you
know, the County Attorney -- I mean, it's -- I get
Matt is his -- is an employee of his and he is here,
but is this not important enough -- it's important
enough that we're all taking our time for this
community to be here. Why is it that -- has the
County Attorney got an excused absence from this
proceedings or his involvement?

CHAIRMAN YATES: As Chair, you know, obviously that is not my decision to make. Matt Golden is serving as counsel for this Court, and I've made no objection to Mr. Golden sitting in.

Mr. Golden, would you want to respond to that?

MR. GOLDEN: And to tell you -- I'm sorry.

To tell you just how serious the County Attorney's

Office believes that this issue is, we have no less than six people from the County Attorney's Office in this room at present to deal with Council Court.

I appreciate your acknowledgment that I am sufficient to be a lawyer in the matter, but no one will contest the fact that the County Attorney's Office believes this is an exceedingly serious matter, and we have put our best and brightest on it, and me, as you would note.

issue as far as -- I can see there's a number of attorneys here. My concern was: Twice before this has been important enough to this community and important enough to this body that we've had the County Attorney here advising and taking part in this, and all of a sudden there's a pass this year, and so I don't understand if he was sick or if there's been, you know, some --

MR. GOLDEN: No, I don't think that that's the case at all. And I'm not exactly sure that this is germane to the hearing. We were provided by your rules that Assistant County Attorneys serve you in any number of ways.

So again, I think the County Attorney, Mike O'Connell, has decided that his best and brightest

will be on this issue, and I think we've been working with the President since day one to assist the process.

But with that being said, I don't think it's germane to what we're here for today.

COUNCIL MEMBER ACKERSON: Well --

CHAIRMAN YATES: Your objection is noted, though, Councilman. Thank you.

Councilman James.

just wanted to ask a question for clarity purposes.

I read in the Courier-Journal this morning the discussion about whose lawyer was being paid and whose lawyers weren't being paid, and just trying to see if I could hear from one of the two of you what is actually going to happen.

CHAIRMAN YATES: That is a contract that has taken place entirely through the County Attorney's Office. This body, nor myself, have had any decision-making capacity as far as picking counsel or contracting with counsel.

Mr. Golden, do you want to follow up on that? Go ahead.

MR. GOLDEN: I'll just say briefly that fees and representation issues for the attorneys that are

before you should not take away from the gravity of the situation that we have before us today, which is the Respondent's hearing.

I'll be happy to address fees after the hearing, but I think it's important that we proceed on the issue at hand.

COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: I was just curious as to why, in the previous two times we've had these issues, that the attorney fees were not paid but in this one they will be.

MR. GOLDEN: I'm not sure that that's completely accurate, but we're looking into it.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And again, that would not be a decision that would be made by the Chair or this body. That would be done through the County Attorney's Office.

COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Councilwoman Barbara -- oh,

she's out.

Okay. Colleagues, if I may continue -Councilwoman Barbara Sexton Smith is back.

COUNCIL MEMBER SEXTON SMITH: Yes. I was just wanting to follow up on Councilman James' line of questioning about the compensation, and I agree completely that the matter of the funds is not

what's in question. I'm trying to figure out if there is a standard or a precedent, because I'm going to focus on process and procedures as much as I possibly can as we go along, and so it appears that there have been two female respondents in the past who did not receive the same financial assistance in doing this, and now we have a male respondent that is receiving the benefit, and I'd like some explanation on that as it relates to precedence and standards.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Well, that would be outside my purview or knowledge about that contract. If the Assistant County Attorney would want to comment, he's more than welcome.

But I do want to make sure, after addressing that question, that we do move forward with the issue at hand and move -- and go ahead and move forward, but if Assistant County Attorney Matt Golden would like to try to answer that to the best of his ability.

MR. GOLDEN: Yeah. To the best of my ability. And please understand I was not made civil division director or was in the civil division during the period of time when the two previous matters occurred, so I'm only speaking with some

general knowledge, but I am not -- I don't know with regard to the very first proceeding if there was actually a hearing. I do not know that, but someone told me that there -- that there was only a summary disposition of the matter at the beginning, but I'm looking into that fact, along with the fact that we believe there was payment -- there were payments made potentially in the second proceeding.

So as I said to you before, I think that the focus that we should be looking at is the proceeding that we're here for today. It is Mr. Johnson's day in court, and the rules have guaranteed him due process, and the statute has guaranteed him a public hearing.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And, Colleagues, for clarification, I had submitted a question, legal question to the County's -- the County Attorney's Office in making a decision of whether or not this body would have to file any kind of objections based on any kind of past act, and the legal response was yes, that any charged Council member has due process rights to be represented by counsel during the removal proceeding and went on to state that they did feel, in their -- their best legal decision, that that shall be paid.

I did not believe it was our position to make the objection on it. Again, that would be a decision to be made by the County Attorney's Office.

Councilwoman Woolridge.

COUNCIL MEMBER WOOLRIDGE: Mr. President, my remarks are to you. I left a message in your office with your very capable assistants yesterday afternoon asking you to phone me for some clarifications as it regards to how many it'd take to keep Councilman Johnson on the committee, was it the two-thirds of the entire Council, either -- or was it the 2 -- the 18 or was it 16?

After I didn't hear from you, around 10:00 o'clock last night I emailed you, and I still did not get a response from you.

So I guess my question to you, Mr. President, I know you're busy, and I stated that in my email to you, but I think you have time for some of the Council members, there's 26 of us, and this is probably the only -- maybe the second time I've even contacted your office this year, so I'm a little disappointed with the lack of response from you.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Well, Councilwoman --

COUNCIL MEMBER WOOLRIDGE: And I still need the answer to the question. Is it two-thirds of

the -- of the entire Council or what is the number that it takes?

CHAIRMAN YATES: As I explained in my message that I returned this morning and left on your voice mail, I apologized for getting back to you. Yesterday was Halloween, I have young kids, so I got your email 10:00 o'clock at night, was obviously getting kids ready for bed. This morning at 7:45 I phoned you back and left you a voice message.

Mr. Golden, I will make sure that -- sends out an email to everyone explaining the legal reasoning behind the determination of the votes.

We -- as Chair, I have followed the advice of counsel, because it's an interpretation of the statute and the legislative intent, not of our rules, and for that reason, I believe that it is in the best interest of this body to follow the advice of counsel, and they have put together -- put together a well-reasoned argument, and that's been requested by several members. I know it is work product, but I'll make the determination to make sure that every member of this body gets that email.

MR. MCADAM: Mr. President --

MR. GOLDEN: If I -- if I could just follow up with that.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Please.

MR. GOLDEN: The Court has already issued an order on numerical requirements. It was an order dated October 25th, 2017. It's of record. It should be in the agenda line item. We'll provide a copy of that order as well. But it lays out the numerical requirements for removal, and it, again, was -- will be in your box again today.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And I think the request is not the order -- you're asking for the reasoning behind that, is that correct, Colleagues? And so I'll make sure that email comes over.

MR. MCADAM: Mr. President, could I request that if you're going to send that to each Council member that you also send them a copy of my legal memorandum that shows that the state law, KRS 67C.143, as amended in the last General Assembly, says it takes two-thirds of the total Council, not just the Court.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Counsel, I'll -- I'll -MR. MCADAM: And with all due respect to Mr.

Golden, he is absolutely wrong in his interpretation of the law. The law means what it says. You can't make the law say what you want it to.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay. Now, I --

MR. MCADAM: And so --

CHAIRMAN YATES: Counsel, let me -- let me stop you there, because --

CHAIRMAN YATES: Counsel, let me stop you, because what I want to go ahead and do is set the stage. Right now wasn't the appropriate time to go ahead and make that argument. What you asked is that your -- that your motion be attached as well --

MR. MCADAM: -- we will -- we will go on --

MR. MCADAM: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN YATES: -- and my response was going to be yes --

MR. MCADAM: Okay.

CHAIRMAN YATES: -- that'll be fine that
everyone has it, but what I'm going to ask is you
please respect the Chair, each -- each colleagues.
We want this to be fair and expeditiously move
forward, so whenever I go to stop you, I will ask
that you please stop then. Do not speak over top of
me.

MS. KENT: Mr. Chair, I was going to make the same request, that the Charging Committee's --

CHAIRMAN YATES: Sure.

MS. KENT: -- response be attached.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And so that you know that

all of these documents will be, obviously, published for the --

MS. KENT: Right.

CHAIRMAN YATES: -- entire committee.

Councilman Ackerson.

COUNCIL MEMBER ACKERSON: Thank you, Mr. President.

In response to Councilwoman Sexton Smith's question about processes, I mean, the reality of the situation is we've had two of these before. Both involved African-American women. They were -- neither one was summarily dismissed, so there were full hearings.

Neither one of those folks -- because I know the attorneys there. One was Derwin Webb. He was never paid by this Council, and number two was Aubrey Williams, who was paid for the ethics -- when there was an ethics hearing, he was paid for the ethics hearing, but he was never paid anything by Metro Government. I spoke to him this morning for clarification. Never paid anything by Metro Government for the trial before this body. He was paid for the ethics commission hearings.

So if you're worried about process, that's the process we're faced with.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Thank you, Colleague.

And again, obviously that determination was made wholly by the Office of the County Attorney, not by this body, and it's not currently before us.

Councilman James.

COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I was just going to basically say what

Councilman Ackerson just said, that there were two
hearings, and both were African-American women, and
their attorneys were not paid for by the County
Attorney's Office, but yet we have changed the
process, and I'm trying to find out why.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Counsel, I do not know why that determination was made. In fact, I don't know even the facts of the previous hearings, how they were paid or whatnot, because that contract would not have come through this body. That was done -- if there was a contract, if there was a payment, either for the ethics remove -- you know, for the trial or there was not, that decision would have been made by the Office of the County Attorney.

The decision here came from a legal response in which I sent legal questions over and they answered it, and I believe because they are our statutory counsel here, I'm following that legal

advice.

But I think that those questions have been presented to them, and I think that there's nothing stopping this body -- because it is outside of this proceeding, it's outside of this hearing, that there's nothing to stop any member of that from asking for a written request or response that would be outlining that, because it sounds pertinent and important; however, I don't want to detract from the hearing before for Councilman Johnson.

COUNCIL MEMBER JAMES: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Councilwoman Barbara Sexton Smith.

COUNCIL MEMBER SEXTON SMITH: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Can we hear a verbal report on how many people make up the Council Court given there was a change that was introduced and you shared with us today related to Councilwoman Flood?

So my first question is: How many make up the number of the Council Court? And then if you would do the math for us and state it verbally, how many represent a simple majority of that number and how many represent a two-thirds of that number, and then state what the number will take to remove

Respondent and what number will it take to retain Respondent.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And that's under -COUNCIL MEMBER SEXTON SMITH: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And that's under the assumption that all members of the Council Court will be able to remain with the exception of Councilwoman Madonna Flood, because she --

COUNCIL MEMBER SEXTON SMITH: Right.

CHAIRMAN YATES: -- does have an excused absence. I believe that number will be 13.

Mr. Golden, if you want to go ahead and break that down as legal counsel.

MR. GOLDEN: Absolutely. So the present members of the Council Court are 19. For removal, pursuant to statute, requires two-thirds of the Council Court to remove. That's 13 out of 19 will be required to remove. Alternatively, seven votes requesting the retention would be what it would be required to be retained in office.

With regard to other motions that are before you, there is a summary disposition motion that has been filed by the Respondent pursuant to Rules 4 and 7. That requires a simple majority. Again, as there are 19 voters voting, the 10-person majority

rule would carry the day on the Respondent's vote for a dismissal. I'm sorry. The Respondent's motion for a dismissal.

So I hope those answer both of your questions that are there.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And additionally, as we go through this proceeding, I'll allow some questions to the end. I think some of them may be addressed through this process, because I know that we're kind of jumping out of order and asking different ones.

So if we would go ahead and kind of move forward, then it may be at the close some of these questions we could ask.

MR. MCADAM: Mr. President, is this -- CHAIRMAN YATES: Mr. Adams [sic].

MR. MCADAM: -- a decision that you've just arrived at? I realize that the conversation with Mrs. Flood was -- only recently occurred, but will this decision be in writing and made part of the record.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Yeah. As you know, obviously we just made that determination together.

MR. MCADAM: You just -- you just decided to change it from 18 to 14, and now it's 14 to 13 to remove. Is that the gravamen of it?

CHAIRMAN YATES: What we just decided is that we would allow one Council member an excused absence so they would not longer be in the court, which would change the number.

MR. MCADAM: Right.

CHAIRMAN YATES: So that would change it, because it's the sitting body. And so all we did was just do the simple math.

MR. MCADAM: Well --

CHAIRMAN YATES: But, yeah, I will. I will ask for that.

MR. MCADAM: And there's nothing in the statute that allows you to do that, nothing --

CHAIRMAN YATES: The argument is, there's nothing to allow you -- in the statute to allow that a member be recused?

MR. MCADAM: That's right. Doesn't mention it.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay. Is that an objection now that you -- because I thought that we --

MR. MCADAM: Well, yes. I mean, you haven't done it in writing. When you do, I'll write -- I'll file a formal objection to that. The rules keep changing as the game is being played.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Well, okay. Colleague,

during our conversation there was not an objection because of the -- I think that it was stated very clearly because of the severity of what she is going through.

MR. MCADAM: No, you misinterpreted.

Absolutely. You are misinterpreting what I said. I said if she was having family medical problems, I had no objection to her not being here.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay.

MR. MCADAM: I reserve the right to argue that that affects the vote total.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And I said you have not waived that argument, so it's not needed to be addressed right now.

All right. For the record, if we're moving forward, I'm President David Yates, and per Metro Council Rule 4 of the Louisville Metro Council Removal Proceeding, I'm serving as Chair.

Everyone knows Matt Golden, who is our Assistant Attorney, who will serve as legal counsel.

The first motion for organizational matters was a motion to quash the subpoena that was filed on behalf of GLI, Mr. Oyler. He's averred that he was not present during the GLI trip and has no personal knowledge of the same, and he seeks to quash the

subpoena.

I'm sorry?

Oh, Counsel, yeah, you may approach. This is your motion. If you'd just state your name for the record, please.

MS. WYRICK: Yes, Your Honor. I'm Mitzi
Wyrick from Wyatt Tarrant & Combs, and I'm
representing GLI and Kent Oyler in this matter.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Thank you.

Well, before we proceed forward, I would ask the parties on both sides whether or not that they believe that Mr. Oyler is a necessary witness, and if so, why. Either party may begin.

MS. KENT: Your Honor, we do not believe Mr. Oyler is a necessary witness. We believe that Sarah Davasher can testify to the facts needed and that she, in fact, as the chief operating officer, is the appropriate corporate officer to appear.

CHAIRMAN YATES: So, Counsel, may I infer that there is no objection to quashing the subpoena of Mr. Oyler?

MS. KENT: No objection.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Mr. Adams [sic].

MR. MCADAM: Well, of course I have an objection. In his affidavit requesting a protective

order against the subpoena, he said that under no circumstances is he or Ms. Davasher going to reveal the name of Jane Doe, Mrs. X, Miss X, whatever.

Here we've got -- here we've got in America, in 2017, a man being accused of saying something that we don't know what he said because nobody's going to repeat what he said, at a location in another state by a person who is unnamed, and that's one of the grounds that the Charging Committee has to remove Dan Johnson and change the election for the 21st Metro District. Okay? An anonymous source who's -- who is -- would have told somebody something and nobody wants to talk about it.

And I want Kent Oyler to come in here because he made public statements in the newspaper about how egregious Dan Johnson's behavior was and how he was barred from any more functions of GLI, and so I think he's a -- I think he's a necessary and important witness, and I have the right, under 13B of the Kentucky Revised Statutes and under the rules of this Court, to subpoena witnesses. He's material, he has been involved in this case, and I want to know that young woman's name so we can issue a subpoena.

This Council Court has a right to hear what

she's going to say. She cannot hide behind 1 anonymity. This is America. You can't do that. 2 3 CHAIRMAN YATES: So as related to Mr. Oyler, it looks like what the -- the attempt is get hearsay 4 5 evidence from hearsay evidence. I believe that he 6 was served with a subpoena by the counsel for the 7 Charging Committee. 8 MS. KENT: Correct. 9 CHAIRMAN YATES: Counsel for the Charging 10 Committee has agreed to quash that subpoena. 11 Mr. Adams [sic], have you subpoenaed Mr. 12 Oyler? MR. MCADAM: Yes, I have. 13 14 MS. KENT: Mr. Chair, I'm sorry, but no, we 15 didn't subpoena. 16 CHAIRMAN YATES: You did not? 17 Not Kent Oyler. MS. KENT: No. 18 CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay. So we're just on Mr. 19 Oyler right now. 20 MS. KENT: Right. 21 CHAIRMAN YATES: Counsel, I know you wrote a 22 written response why this should be quashed. 23 may address.

direct knowledge of the event in question that

24

25

MS. WYRICK: Yes. Mr. Oyler doesn't have any

occurred in the Austin GLI trip. He didn't witness it. He didn't communicate the decision to ban to this Council, Ms. Davasher did, and she will be here to testify. And his only knowledge of this incident is what -- his discussion with Ms. Davasher. We think it's unnecessary, cumulative, and will add nothing to the proceedings.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Thank you, Counsel.

Councilwoman Kent -- I mean Counsel Kent.

MS. KENT: Counselor.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Counselor Kent, I'm -- we'll quash the subpoena as it relates to Mr. Oyler because we're getting everything there, but in doing so, it is the opinion of the Chair that none of his statements, his information or hearsay of Mr. Oyler should be brought in.

Is there any objection to that by any party?

MS. KENT: Your Honor, the reason that Sarah

Davasher is appearing is to explain this

unprecedented ban, and that is the question that we

believe people want to know, how did this bizarre

and unprecedented thing come to be?

CHAIRMAN YATES: And if that comes from Sarah Wisdom, then that's fine, it comes from her, but it would not be -- we would have any remarks to some

hearsay evidence to a witness that would not be appearing; is that correct?

MS. KENT: Well, Your Honor, I have to point out that hearsay testimony is acceptable in an administrative hearing. Since we're not in a court of law, we have a different set of evidentiary rules, and hearsay can be heard. It's up to this Court to decide the weight of that hearsay testimony, the reliability of that hearsay testimony, but under the common law of administrative law, it is acceptable.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And -- and --

MR. MCADAM: But Mr. -- Mr. President --

CHAIRMAN YATES: -- correction. In a -hearsay in this kind of proceeding would only be -only be admissible in the event that -- I think the
words is it's reliable and that a reasonable and
prudent person would rely on such.

MR. MCADAM: That's what --

CHAIRMAN YATES: So while there are exceptions --

MR. MCADAM: That's what 13B says, yes.

CHAIRMAN YATES: -- and I'm -- okay. And I'm coming to that as I go through, because we also come to the next one. I'm making a ruling on the Court

is to quash as it relates to --1 2 MR. MCADAM: May I -- may I ask one 3 question --4 CHAIRMAN YATES: You may. 5 MR. MCADAM: -- of counsel? Either counsel. 6 Will either of the witnesses available at GLI tell 7 us the name of the young woman who has brought this 8 ridiculous complaint so that she can be compelled to 9 testify what was said and what the context was? 10 that's --11 CHAIRMAN YATES: And who is that question 12 directed to? MR. MCADAM: Anybody that can answer it. 13 14 Apparently nobody can answer it. CHAIRMAN YATES: Yeah. 15 16 MR. MCADAM: I want --I think that would be hard 17 CHAIRMAN YATES: 18 for them to tell us what an individual will be 19 testifying. I think that if we have the --20 MR. MCADAM: Just what's her name? I just 21 want to know what her name is. CHAIRMAN YATES: So what you're saying, Mr. 22 23 Oyler is being -- I'm going to quash the subpoena of 24 Mr. Oyler and I am going to limit any mention of the

ban and everything to the testimony which is brought

25

forth by at least some witnesses that can be before this Court, and that's meant -- as far as what Mr.

Oyler decided, it would have to be attested to by Sarah or someone else who's over here.

MS. KENT: Mr. Chair.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Yes.

MS. KENT: I just have one thing to say.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Uh-huh.

MS. KENT: We both agree that hearsay is admissible, but I think I'd like to correct what you just said. The problem with hearsay is that in order for the Court to rely on hearsay, that hearsay must be corroborated. The question -- the normal questions of relevance and weight, of course they will apply in deciding who to believe. But as far as the admission of hearsay, it is to be admitted, but if it is not corroborated, it cannot be the basis of a finding.

And that ultimately is how the hearsay rule boils down in administrative law. You can hear it, you can decide if it's relevant, you can decide if it has any weight, but in the end, if it isn't corroborated, you can't use it to base a finding on.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And I do not want to get in a debate on the finding of fact. I do have our

Assistant County Attorney, whom I believe agrees with my opinion on it, because it can't be sufficient in and of itself, and then -- but what I'm saying is, if I quash this individual, where he does not have to appear, I'm not going to allow the Charging Committee to put words that he would have said had he been here.

MS. KENT: Oh, absolutely not.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay. Mr. Golden, do you want to respond to the basis of the hearsay evidence and that it should only be admitted in the event that the agency --

MR. GOLDEN: Yeah. I would stress -- my apologies. I would stress that hearsay evidence is admissible in an administrative proceeding if and only if it is such evidence that reasonable and prudent persons would rely upon it in their daily affairs.

And the statute goes on to say, (Reading) but it shall not be sufficient in and of itself to support an agency's findings of facts --

MS. KENT: Absolutely.

MR. GOLDEN: -- unless it would be admissible over objections in civil actions.

And what that means is, the rules of

evidence, specifically KRE 803, begin to pick up and say these are the type of exceptions to the hearsay rule.

So we can't just say all evidence is admissible in an administrative proceeding such as this because it is not. It must have some inherent reliability to it to be given any deference or weight.

MS. KENT: But if it is reliable, it is admitted, with the caution that if it's not properly corroborated, and if a finding is based on uncorroborated hearsay, that that finding may be overturned by --

MR. MCADAM: That's not what 13B says. She's making that up.

MS. KENT: But 13 --

MR. MCADAM: You have a copy right in front of you.

MR. GOLDEN: Is that 803?

MR. MCADAM: That's not what the law is.

MR. GOLDEN: Yeah, and I'll just read the statute again. It's --

MR. MCADAM: It doesn't mention corroboration.

MR. GOLDEN: Well, in a way, you cannot carry

the day with hearsay. 1 MR. MCADAM: Correct. 2 3 MR. GOLDEN: I think that's what she's trying 4 to say. 5 MS. KENT: That's exactly, yeah. CHAIRMAN YATES: Something more. 6 7 MR. GOLDEN: There has to be something more 8 than that. So an agency cannot issue findings of 9 fact based upon --10 MR. MCADAM: You can't have two people that heard the same rumor both say, "Yeah, I heard the 11 12 same rumor." That's not corroboration. 13 MR. GOLDEN: That's still hearsay; that's 14 correct. MR. MCADAM: Of course it is, and it's not 15 16 enough to sustain the burden of proof. CHAIRMAN YATES: That would still be hearsay, 17 18 yes. 19 MS. KENT: And, Mr. Chair --20 CHAIRMAN YATES: Yes. 21 MS. KENT: -- since it came up, and this is 22 the first time it has come up, I would like to talk about the perception that 13B has any application to 23 this proceeding. I believe it's -- it's within the 24

first couple of pages of 13B. 13B.020, Application

25

of This Chapter, Exemptions. Paragraph 2 says, "The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to," and we go down the list to (f), which says,

"Administrative hearings conducted by any city,
county, urban-county, charter county, or special
district contained in KRS Chapters 65 to 109, or any
other unit of local government operating strictly in a local jurisdictional capacity."

Now, this 13B then goes on to exempt a whole bunch of state hearings, which hearings of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Justice and Public Safety, etcetera, are also exempt from 13B.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And the -- I just -- just to keep -- because the argument --

MS. KENT: Yeah.

CHAIRMAN YATES: -- under Rule 16, the evidentiary standards, we chose to accept that, this body did.

MS. KENT: Chose to accept 13B?

CHAIRMAN YATES: No, the procedural and evidentiary rules will be those generally accepted in Kentucky for administrative --

MS. KENT: Right.

CHAIRMAN YATES: -- for administrative proceedings. That was under Rule 16, and which this

body agreed to accept, and so on advice of counsel -- and obviously this is a very different kind of proceeding, as we all know.

MS. KENT: Uh-huh.

CHAIRMAN YATES: That was the advice of the counsel is why.

MS. KENT: Well, and I don't want to belabor this, but there is a reason why local administrative hearings are exempted and why this long list of state hearing adjudicative bodies are also exempted. And while many people would like to see a uniform body of administrative law and would love it if 13B would serve that purpose, it does not. It is not the common law of administrative bodies in Kentucky. It is -- it only applies to the agencies that the legislature has put under 13B.

MR. MCADAM: Mr. President, this is not an administrative hearing. This is a legislative hearing. Counsel is mistaken in that regard.

And what this Council has done is they have adopted the procedures and evidentiary rules of the state law in 13B at -- they could have adopted the Hammurabi code and it would still be -- in other words, I'm agreeing with you.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay. And again, we don't

want to belabor the point because it --

MS. KENT: I do have to correct one thing -- CHAIRMAN YATES: Please do.

MS. KENT: -- Mr. Chair. I'm sorry. But this is an administrative hearing. I think we have a case going back -- ah. Let's see. Arbogast, and it was --

MR. STEWART: 1935.

MS. KENT: I'm sorry? 1935, Arbogast, and it was attached in my motion, and that is where it states that removal proceedings are administrative proceedings. That's black -- that's court-made law.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Councilwoman Barbara Sexton Smith.

COUNCIL MEMBER SEXTON SMITH: Yes. Mr.

Chair, could you or Mr. Golden explain to me and everyone else, do we have something -- is this an administrative hearing, is it a removal hearing, or is it a legislative hearing, or is it two or three of the above? And do we have specific guidelines that we can use to guide us as we go through these hearings? So what kind of hearing is this officially?

MR. GOLDEN: This is a removal hearing that exists under 67C.143.

COUNCIL MEMBER SEXTON SMITH: Does 13B govern what we're going to do here?

MR. GOLDEN: The Council as a body, not just the Council Court, but the Council as a body has adopted removal rules. Those were emailed to every member of this body early on in the proceeding as a guideline, a talisman, and a touchstone for this proceeding.

That rule, specifically Rule 16 that

President Yates mentioned, within those removal

rules adopts for this body the administrative

hearing rules that exist in Kentucky. So we use

those as part of the due process -- the Council as a

whole, not just the Council Court, the due process

that you-all have afforded within your rules in Rule

Number 2.

So again, in thinking about our different layers, 67C sets forth that this is a removal hearing. You-all as a body have determined what your rules are. Those rules talk about things like due process and evidentiary standards and so on, and much of what I would suggest everyone does, much of your questions will be answered by those rules unless they are somehow superseded or in conflict with 67C.143.

MS. KENT: Mr. Chair, if I could just say, I understand evidentiary -- "Rule 16. Evidentiary Standards. Procedural and evidentiary rules will be those generally accepted in Kentucky for administrative proceedings."

It does not say "will be found in 13B."

That's my problem. There's a lot -- in order to practice administrative law in this state, you have to rely on case law, because every administrative body is different.

MR. GOLDEN: Well, if it helps at all, the seminal case of Drummond on administrative hearings talks exactly about the same standard with regard to hearsay. Back to the subject at hand, Drummond mentions the rules under 13B as applicable in administrative hearings.

So again, if the body has chosen to follow administrative hearing law, the body should follow Drummond and 13B.

MS. KENT: But you cannot declare 13B as the common law of administrative law in Kentucky. In some -- for example, the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights, on which I served for almost ten years, we never looked to 13B, ever.

If we did not have in our enabling statute or

McLENDON-KOGUT REPORTING SERVICE, LLC (502) 585-5634

within the rules and -- procedural rules drawn up by the Commission, quite honestly, rather than 13B, we would more likely look at civil rules to see how they handled questions of due process. But it was a matter of the adjudicative body wrote it, wrote its rules and, when there were gaps in the rule, looked to see what solutions we could find in civil rules, not in 13B, to do the one thing, the main thing that an adjudicative body has to do, and that is see to it that due process occurs. But it's not -- due process is not always found in 13B.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Counsel, I know that you're still at the mike, and we have another motion. We have ruled on a motion as it regard to Mr. Oyler.

The next -- could you -- will you please let us know your next motion to quash?

MS. WYRICK: My next motion is a motion for protective order. Mr. -- the Respondent has made it clear that they intend to question witnesses about the identity of Jane Doe, who is a GLI staffer, and to subpoena her if her identity is revealed, and we're asking for a protective order to prevent that from occurring.

Our staffer came forward after the Austin trip with a complaint about Councilman Johnson's

behavior. She asked that her identity be concealed and that she be able to make this compliant confidentially. That was done.

GLI made the determination that Councilman Johnson's behavior was inappropriate and that it would ban Mr. Johnson from attending any future GLI events.

The Respondent is free to question our witness regarding that ban and what led to the institution of that ban. If he then wants to argue that the evidence is insufficient, so be it, but we think this is simply an attempt to drag a third party who has asked that her confidentiality be maintained, to intimidate and embarrass her publicly in this proceeding.

So we would ask that a protective order be granted.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And just to lay out what we have before us, in going through the -- with regard to the motion of Jane Doe, she is an anonymous witness. The Charging Committee alleged that during the GLI-sponsored event, Respondent engaged in misconduct directed at Miss Doe. We have that allegation. The Charging Committee alleges that Miss Doe reported these events to a superior at GLI,

and that's where that you would have Sarah Wisdom.

The Charging Committee would seek to provide

evidence of this report and Miss Doe's statements in

the matter.

In reviewing, to the extent that the Charging Committee proffers Miss Doe's statements to her supervisors as truth, in the event that that's put forward, that her statements were, in fact, true, Respondent's statements of misconduct, the statements are hearsay, and we all would know that, and I know that we discussed what would be admissible and what's not. They're out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

And upon review and advice of counsel and on the pleadings, the only source of information as to the allegations of Respondent's misconduct on the GLI event that the Charging Committee has tendered is Miss Doe, so we know that because that is the primary source.

The Charging Committee has previously stated that -- and we went through this, that the hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings.

That's -- and we talked about why this body may not believe that's entirely accurate in all matters, and

that we have decided the proper legal standard is that hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings only if it is reliable and that reasonable and prudent persons rely on such.

And that -- I know Matt Golden briefly touched on that, that they rely on such evidence in their daily affairs and that it would be so -- it would be that high. But it can't be sufficient in and of itself to support an agency's finding of facts unless it would be admissible over objections in a civil -- in our civil actions. And that's where we get back to 13B, and we've already had that whole debate and argument over that. But that is the opinion of the legal counsel, which has given me some direction on this.

It's unlikely that an anonymous statement would be inherently reliable, and therefore it is not, I don't believe, an exception to hearsay without something more.

So in short, the allegations concerning Jane
Doe's anonymous statement, they don't satisfy either
prong on the face, as we are right now, concerning
the Charging Committee's allegation.

So what we have to do is look at it and say regardless of the nature of the allegations against

Respondent, anonymous statements, they -- as law, we know from our civil practice, a lot of us, that even on the basis they would offend the Fifth and the Fourteenth amendments' due process right to question witnesses.

Now, I agree that this is much more relaxed here, and I believe that it's much more relaxed in the Sixth Amendment right to criminal cases.

However -- and there's an assortment of case law that's been provided. That even our recently enacted sexual harassment policy here on the Metro Council does not allow anonymous statements and grants the accused a right to confront or, you know, to be consistent with due process. And again, that was on advice of counsel as well.

Thus, we're left with the decision that if the Charging Committee wishes to proceed on the allegations of misconduct concerning the GLI trip, just that allegation, the accused will have the right to examine the presently anonymous witness.

If the only evidence the Charging Committee can offer are these anonymous statements conveyed to another without granting the accused the right to examine Jane Doe, then the evidence would not be admissible and would not be sufficient by itself to

warrant a finding of misconduct. That decision was met after significant research and looking into this and advice of counsel.

When I had sent all of this over to both parties in an email this afternoon and had asked the Charging Committee if they still wished to proceed in reliance on Jane Doe's allegation, after an explanation that we've just made, and that's an explanation that's been bind through the advice of counsel, the Office of the County Attorney, and that's the interpretation of the law as it relates to the proceedings, and if they do -- and I know there may be some determination of how we want to proceed, but if they do, which is the absolute right of the Charging Committee, they trigger the collateral right of the Respondent to examine her.

In the event that does, I will do everything in this Court's, or this -- in our -- whatever we have at our purview to let her proceed in her pseudonym, under Jane Doe, to ask all cameras not be directed towards her, ask Metro TV not to do so, and then ask that her information and any kind of protected information, pertinent, intimate, otherwise, be kept within this body. So that's based on my legal advice.

And so I guess my question is, to the 1 2 Charging Committee, do they wish to proceed forward 3 on that and move forward based on Jane Doe's allegation? If so, that's what it triggers. Or if 4 5 not, we can move forward on the other charges. 6 MS. KENT: Mr. Chair, could we take a short 7 recess? 8 CHAIRMAN YATES: Please. 9 MS. KENT: Thank you. Ten minutes? What you 10 gonna give us? 11 CHAIRMAN YATES: Counsel, I know you asked for the recess. How long do you need? Do you --12 MS. KENT: Ten minutes. 13 14 CHAIRMAN YATES: Ten minutes. 15 MS. KENT: Okay. 16 CHAIRMAN YATES: We'll recess for ten 17 minutes. 18 MS. KENT: Thank you. 19 (Recess from 2:02 p.m. to 2:19 p.m.) 20 CHAIRMAN YATES: All right. Council Court is back in session after a short break. 21 22 MS. KENT: Mr. Chair. 23 CHAIRMAN YATES: Counsel. 24 MS. KENT: May we have a brief conference 25 with you with the counsel for GLI --

CHAIRMAN YATES: You may approach.

MS. KENT: -- and Mr. McAdams [sic]? Thank you.

(Bench conference from 2:20 p.m. to 2:27 p.m.)

CHAIRMAN YATES: Before we go back on, I'm -
I guess we're still on. I wanted to recognize our

colleague, Councilwoman Denton, has joined us some

time again -- some time ago. I apologize for just

now mentioning that for the record.

And any members who were late, tardy, or miss will be watching all proceedings on the video.

We just had a short chat at -- up here at the -- I guess the bench is what we call it. I anticipate going ahead and drafting a protective order, a proposed protective order based upon the information I have received from both colleagues, and as they will decide whether or not it's pertinent, necessary, if that individual is called as a witness.

If the -- if counsel for either party decide to call her, she will only be called pursuant to that protective order, and we'll get something in place now and I'll -- again, we can have a discussion over the parameters of it, but I will anticipate doing everything within this Council

Court's power to protect her identity, to protect the record, making sure that she is not visible for any of the cameras but would be present for this Council.

MS. KENT: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Thank you.

Next up, Counsel Deborah Kent, you had -- the Charging Committee has filed a motion for summary judgment. It's back out on this, but I believe there is a significant legal prohibition pursuant to 67C.143. 67C.143.

You know, and everybody -- I guess for the members of this body, this is the statute that says you only allow removal after a full public hearing. To my knowledge, Mr. Johnson has not waived his right to this hearing. As such, it's statutorily impermissible for motions to proceed in affirmative vote for a summary removal without a full public hearing, on advice of counsel, will result in an appeal, and then I would urge my colleagues to vote no pursuant to that advice as we would be denying a fundamental due process.

Again, that has nothing to do with the individual charges or the individual, but based on the advice of our counsel from the Office of the

County Attorney, and pursuant to our rules, which are in conflict with the statute, this is a simple majority vote.

So again, as a matter of law, I would urge you that we -- that it's impermissible to vote no.

I'm going to let -- before I let counsel discuss it,

I'll let our attorney on the matter, Mr. Golden,

address that in any more detail, why we have come to that conclusion.

MR. GOLDEN: Yes. Again -- again, as

Councilwoman Sexton Smith had noted before, to try
and understand what process we're going through, the
removal process is sort forth for you by 67C, and it
does entitle the Respondent, any respondent, to a
full public hearing without -- any vote by this body
that acts to deny the full public hearing would be a
denial of the statutory rights set forth by that
statute. So there's no expedited manner to remove
an official without a hearing, at least not under
67C.

So with that being said, if this body votes to grant a summary removal, the matter will likely be appealed, and it will be, relatively speaking, automatic, because there is a statutory right guaranteed.

Obviously the parties are going to have to address the issue anyway as to why a summary motion would be applicable despite the statute.

One thing to keep in mind for conflicts between statutes and ordinal rules: Statutes supersede ordinal rules. So the fact that the ordinal rules may talk about summary judgment motions without specifically addressing a Charging Committee's right to make a summary judgment is of no import. The touchstone of this inquiry has to be 67C's -- 143's guarantee of that public hearing right.

So again, we have great discomfort with granting a summary motion in the circumstance.

CHAIRMAN YATES: At this time I'm going to allow a couple questions before we vote. In the queue is Councilwoman Cheri Bryant Hamilton.

COUNCIL MEMBER BRYANT HAMILTON: Thank you.

I was just wondering, this is a motion that the full Court will vote on.

MR. GOLDEN: That's correct.

COUNCIL MEMBER BRYANT HAMILTON: Are there other motions that -- because other ones you have ruled from the Chair.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Yeah, there will be --

COUNCIL MEMBER BRYANT HAMILTON: And I was just wondering, what's the difference in allowing us to vote on this motion?

Just briefly, again, those rules MR. GOLDEN: that you set forth are your touchstones. So Rules 4 and 7 and those rules that we circulated before -and we'll circulate them again, along with a couple of the orders that addressed other questions. Rules 4 and 7 designate the presiding officer, in this case President Yates, as the decision-maker on things procedural. And then on things substantive, like removal itself, that goes to the full Council Court. So Rule 4 and Rule 7 address exactly this scenario, that motions to dismiss and summary motions would need to be addressed by the full Council Court. The easiest way to think about it, again, is the procedural versus the substantive.

MS. KENT: Mr. --

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

COUNCIL MEMBER BRYANT HAMILTON: Thank you.

MS. KENT: Mr. Chair.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Yes.

MS. KENT: I'm sorry, this is -- you're moving ahead with a vote on the summary judgment motion, but the summary judgment motion hasn't been heard. And before we even get there, I would just

like to say --

I'm going to let you make your argument. What I wanted to do before, because I didn't want you -- to interrupt your argument, people were in the queue, and I think they were asking more of kind of the substantive, how that was happening, the vote, and why. So I want to get some of that out of the way, and then --

MS. KENT: Okay. And I think I might be able to answer some questions.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay.

MS. KENT: That's what I wanted to say.

These rules were written back in 2011, and I presume that they were written by a lawyer, and that lawyer provided for summary disposition motions. The reason I think that lawyer wrote the rules the way they did is because, when they read 67C and they read the sentence, "No elected officer shall be removed without having been given the right to a full public hearing," they read that and thought what I believe, and that is, all of us, when brought before a court on charges, have the right to be heard, have a right to present a defense.

So this applies to the Respondent in this

case just as it applies to a defendant over in circuit court. They have the right to have their defense heard. They have their right -- and that defense will be in public, in a public courtroom.

I don't think that Section 2 says any more than that. It does not say that you must be removed after a full trial. It says a hearing.

Now, normally what we do with a summary judgment motion is we present that motion to the Court, a response is filed by the Respondent, and then the Court schedules time to hear the summary judgment motion, and in hearing that summary judgment motion, they hear the defense.

So I don't see how a summary judgment motion -- and that's why I jumped ahead when it seemed like you were going to a vote. I don't understand how the Court can vote on the summary judgment motion until they have heard it argued, because that is where the Defendant -- the Respondent's due process rights are honored.

He was given notice, he was presented with the evidence, he was given an opportunity to file a response, and then he gets an opportunity to argue that response in front of the Court. And I think that satisfies the right to a full public hearing.

It is not the right to a trial.

If this is a court, then this Council Court has the same responsibility that every court across the street has, and that is to run your proceedings in an efficient manner. And that's why courts entertain summary judgment motions, because if there's no need for a trial, there shouldn't be a trial. If the summary judgment motion shows that there is no way the defendant can prevail, then the summary judgment motion is granted.

So I do -- I definitely do not agree with this new interpretation of this rule when I do not see anything in 67C that says anything other than the Respondent has a right to be heard in his defense and that hearing will take place in public.

He now has all the evidence in front of him from the summary judgment motion and knows what the facts are to be presented at trial and presumably is prepared to respond.

CHAIRMAN YATES: I'm going to let the
Assistant County Attorney respond for the legal
analysis and then I'm going to let Councilman
Hollander, who is in the queue, also come in.

MR. GOLDEN: And I don't want to foreclose
Mr. McAdams [sic] from responding to --

McLENDON-KOGUT REPORTING SERVICE, LLC (502) 585-5634

MR. MCADAM: Well --

MR. GOLDEN: Why don't --

MR. MCADAM: -- just say briefly that I agree with Counsel's interpretation of 67C. I don't think there's any question about it. A summary judgment in the civil court, as she is referring to, you have to come to the court and say, "If everything the defendant says is true is true, I still win." Okay? The plaintiff still wins. You have to admit that everything they said is true.

So she, to get a summary judgment, is going to have to admit that everything we filed is true. You don't have summary judgments in criminal cases where people are accused of misconduct. You can't have a directed verdict. The verdict -- the judge can't come in and say, "Jury, you must find this person guilty. I'm finding a summary judgment."

What does a -- what does fairness have to do with any of this stuff? The rules that this body has adopted says he has the right to a fair hearing. Fair hearing with due process. 67C says he has the right to a hearing.

Is it a fair hearing when we can't cross-examine witnesses, that we have to take all of their affidavits at face value, take all of their

exhibits at face value?

This is a sad day. I've never heard of anything so silly as to ask for a directed verdict in a -- in an impeachment hearing. It's -- well, I agree with what Mr. Golden is about to say.

MS. KENT: Mr. Chair, I'll just say this, that anyone who has been found against in a court based on a summary judgment motion has been denied due process, if I understand your logic, that to dispose of a case in a summary fashion denies the defendant due process rights, then I don't understand how any court grants summary judgment motions.

MR. GOLDEN: Well, I can tell you how courts grant summary judgment motions, because there's a particular rule that talks about summary judgment motions under Rule 56. It's been interpreted several ways. That says that assuming everything that the nonmovant said is true, under such circumstances you can grant summary proceedings in litigation.

This is a removal hearing and slightly different, because one of the rights that's not technically guaranteed to a litigant, that is to have their day in court, to have a jury trial, is

guaranteed in this case. It is guaranteed under 67C.143, and with permission I'd like to read (2).

"No elected officer shall be removed without having been given the right to a full public hearing."

Following that, with regard to the rules adopted by the body, the body has determined that they know what a due process means, the right to call witnesses, to subpoen them, to have a hearing, to consider what evidence, to present exhibits.

That is the full public hearing, i.e. the due process that this body, the entire body, determined was due.

Again, I urge the vote of no. I think

President Yates would urge the vote of no on this

matter simply because it's a guarantee for an

appeal. Because the statute says "full public

hearing," if it goes up, it'll come back down and

we'll try the case again, because there is no

question in my mind what "full public hearing" would

mean. You've defined it, or the Council has defined

"full public hearing" in its rules.

MS. KENT: Without -- I'm sorry.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And before -- before you jump in, after Mr. Golden is finished.

MR. GOLDEN: I'm done.

CHAIRMAN YATES: I'm going to let Councilman Hollander jump in the queue and then I'll go back to you.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLLANDER: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I think that Rule 2 of our own rules are applicable here, not just the statute, although obviously the statute governs. The statute says no member -- no elected officer shall be removed without the right to a full public hearing.

I have a couple of questions, though, for either the Chair or the County Attorney. I was not here for the other two removal proceedings, but it's my understanding that this motion wasn't even brought by the Respondents in those cases. Is that your understanding as well?

CHAIRMAN YATES: You wanted to know whether or not this motion was brought previously by the respondents in the other removal hearings?

MR. GOLDEN: No. This is the first time that I've ever heard of a summary proceeding for removal.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLLANDER: That seemed apparent to me. And I guess one other question I had: As I understand it, we did not give the Respondent the opportunity to take depositions in

this matter; is that correct?

MR. GOLDEN: No, but I will -- I will say this: No discovery order was sought by the parties, but I would -- I would like to add one other subject here regarding summary removals, and it's a conflict between the rule and the statute. The rule would say summary matters can be dealt with by a simple majority. I believe that you-all had asked previously how many votes are required under a summary motion. It's a simple majority. However, for removal, pursuant to the statute, it is two-thirds of the Council Court. So the conflict exists between the rule and the statute in question.

And then, you know, back to your -- your question, Councilman Hollander, how many -- whether this particularly expedited proceeding, was the party afforded the opportunity to develop their case and develop witnesses?

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLLANDER: Well, that's my point. Rule 2 provides -- we have provided as a Council that the member charged has the right to be represented, the right to introduce evidence, and the right to examine witnesses, and unless there has been a right to have depositions in this case, I don't know how the Respondent has been -- has had a

right to examine witnesses if we -- if we proceed with a summary disposition.

That's quite different than a summary judgment in a civil court. I've never seen a judge grant a summary judgment and say, "You can't take any evidence beforehand, you can't question any witnesses, I'm just going to grant a summary judgment." In most cases -- in fact, I think it's part of the rule that you can delay a summary judgment while you have an opportunity to examine witnesses.

So it seems to me that this is just -- just simply does not constitute fundamental due process or meet the statute or meet our rule, and it certainly is not, apparently, in keeping with what we've ever done before in these proceedings.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Counsel, I know that you stated, so has there been -- are you wanting to present the argument on the motion for summary judgment now or were you wanting to reserve that right, because my understanding was that was presented now, at the beginning of this process, and it was to be ruled on by this Council. I felt like your statement may have been otherwise just a second

ago.

MS. KENT: No. It was my understanding that the summary judgment motion would be heard and argued today at 1:00 o'clock and that the Council could then -- after hearing the arguments, after hearing the evidence, after hearing the Respondent, could then, by simple majority, vote on the motion. Now, that would still require two-thirds to vote on the ultimate question of removal.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay. And so it has been the decision of the Chair, on advice of counsel, that that would be -- it would not be permissible to do that at this point, and so -- and not to waste -- because in the event that it's impermissible by the advice of our counsel, I think to go ahead and have a full hearing on that motion for summary judgment, wait for a vote, knowing that the vote is impermissible, would be a waste of this time and your time, your colleagues and everyone here.

So I would ask -- and you may object. I'd ask that we go ahead and move forward on the vote on the motion for summary judgment, ask that this body follow the advice of counsel, vote no on that, and then we would -- that way we would be closer to the actual trial. That would be the advice of counsel,

correct?

If you wanted to make some statements early on, but I would want, obviously, in the interest of time, because we know how that ruling has been advised, that we go ahead and vote no on that.

MR. MCADAM: Mr. President, a point of order, I guess. Who gets to vote on this? The entire Council? The Court? Does Dan Johnson get to vote on it? Does the Charging Committee get to vote on it?

MR. GOLDEN: The Council Court has been identified as the 19 members you see before you. The two-thirds -- I'm sorry. Those are the voters at hand.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And because this is a substantive matter, it has to be. So even though I would give the advice of our counsel to my colleagues, they're still entitled under our rules the right to vote.

MR. MCADAM: But it passes or fails by a simple majority?

CHAIRMAN YATES: Yes. That's correct.

MR. GOLDEN: That's --

MR. MCADAM: Is that --

MR. GOLDEN: That is the unfortunate aspect

of these rules.

MR. MCADAM: Is that 10 or 11?

MR. GOLDEN: My understanding of a majority of 19 would be 10, if I'm doing my math right. I can take my shoes off and get to 20.

MR. MCADAM: Okay. Because -- is the President voting then is what you're saying? Majority of those --

MR. GOLDEN: Yes.

MR. MCADAM: -- present voting?

MR. GOLDEN: Yes.

MR. MCADAM: Okay. Fine.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Councilman Ackerson.

COUNCIL MEMBER ACKERSON: Thank you, Mr.

President.

I think that Councilman Hollander spoke very eloquently about summary judgment in this sort of instance. I'm baffled that we're even talking about it without giving Councilman Johnson the right to present a full case.

I'm looking at the 67C.143 and I'm -- you know, I'm confused also by the numbers we're talking about here, why we're even holding a vote for a summary disposition. Why are we even having that?

I would have -- I personally would object to us even

voting on it with -- under the recommendation that we vote it down. I don't think that's proper under the due process that Councilman Johnson is -- should be afforded here.

And I'm looking at the 67C.143, and it's clearly stating that five members have to bring the charges, and it clearly states that no legislative council member proffering a charge shall sit as a member of the legislative council when it tries that charge.

So 26 minus the 5 leaves us with 21, you know. And so when I'm hearing 19, which then -- simple majorities are 10. It's two-thirds also for any -- for any conviction under this statute. And so if we're talking about a conviction being summarily, that would also require more than a simple majority.

So, you know, I'm just concerned here about, you know, giving my colleague at least his fair day in court before we -- before anyone rushes to decisions, and as Councilman Kramer is big on procedures, that the procedures are properly followed. The statute I don't think could be any more clear.

MR. GOLDEN: No, Councilman Ackerson, I will

say this for the record: I agree with you fully.

COUNCIL MEMBER ACKERSON: Thank you.

MR. GOLDEN: The issue -- the issue at hand is, there is a conflict between the rules and the statute over the majority versus the two-thirds of the Council Court. I'd almost urge the Charging Committee to withdraw this so that if there is an appeal had that the record is clear. The statute is very clear about public -- full public hearings, the statute is very clear about the numbers requisite for removal, and this needlessly confuses the issues on appeal, I feel. So it's a -- it is a path to an appeal.

MS. KENT: I think there are some other paths as well, so I'm not sure that withdrawing this motion would eliminate those.

CHAIRMAN YATES: From my Council Court,

Colleagues, are there any other questions on this

motion at hand before we ask for a roll call vote?

Councilman -- well, I got Councilman Peden and then Councilwoman Barbara Sexton Smith clicked in.

COUNCIL MEMBER PEDEN: Knowing that this is somewhere between court and a regular Council meeting --

CHAIRMAN YATES: Somewhere.

COUNCIL MEMBER PEDEN: -- somewhere in that, knowing that taking a vote on this actually ends that motion, which some people don't necessarily want to do, I mean, at least on counsel level, there -- counsel, lower level. Sorry. The lawyers involved.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Right.

COUNCIL MEMBER PEDEN: Is it -- are we in order just to -- someone make a motion to move item 3 to the end and let it hang out there for a while until we get a little further along in this?

MR. GOLDEN: I'm consulting with my parliamentarian. She says absolutely.

COUNCIL MEMBER PEDEN: Then --

CHAIRMAN YATES: I feel like that motion would almost -- because the motion by the Charging Committee brought before us, and obviously I think the way you present your evidence would be important in any kind of trial proceeding, would that be the will of the members, to -- or is this asking to be presented at the moment?

MS. KENT: Your Honor, just a second.

COUNCIL MEMBER PEDEN: Mr. Chair, I make a motion that we delay this until day two, till the

end, till a date certain, which typically seems to be something that we do.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Is there a second for that?

COUNCIL MEMBER BENSON: Second.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And let me -- let me check with counsel whether or not -- because this is obviously such an odd animal, because that's normally what we would do in Council, we have a motion, second come in. I'm not sure that in a removal proceeding --

COUNCIL MEMBER BRYANT HAMILTON: Mr. Chair?

CHAIRMAN YATES: Somebody's --

COUNCIL MEMBER BRYANT HAMILTON: Is there a question on the motion? Can I have a question on the motion?

CHAIRMAN YATES: Yeah, go ahead. While they're -- while we're consulting with counsel.

COUNCIL MEMBER BRYANT HAMILTON: Okay. I'm wondering about the necessity for the delay of not doing it today. What was the reasoning? I mean, were we waiting on another answer or another opinion or --

CHAIRMAN YATES: I think the advice of legal counsel is that they're entitled to the full hearing.

COUNCIL MEMBER BRYANT HAMILTON: Right

CHAIRMAN YATES: And then -- so they would -- and as Councilman Hollander had kind of went on, and Councilman Ackerson and Matt Golden, so I'm not sure that by waiting a couple days or a day that it would relieve us from that finding. That was the motion, and I think maybe sometimes -- that's before us, deciding if that is correct parliamentary procedure.

MR. GOLDEN: Yeah. I talked to Sarah Martin, who is our official parliamentarian. She would agree that tabling it until the end almost moots the issue anyway, because you've had your full public hearing.

MS. KENT: Right. Uh-huh.

MR. GOLDEN: And then the numbers -- the numbers will be what the numbers will be for removal pursuant to the statute. So I think that if that would be the motion to be made, to table it until end of the hearing, it --

MS. KENT: Well, if I may offer, it doesn't necessarily have to be till the end of the hearing.

Do we want to pick up -- put it on the table till tomorrow?

CHAIRMAN YATES: I think the dangerous word is "entitled to a full hearing," and in the event

that we cut the hearing off, we cut off the "full" part, and I think that's been the advice of counsel.

And so in the event that we move through these proceedings, almost towards the end or whatever that is, and then proceed against advice of counsel, I would urge against that.

Councilwoman Barbara Sexton Smith had put into the queue and I had clicked you out.

COUNCIL MEMBER SEXTON SMITH: Yes, Mr. Chair.

So I just need to seek clarification again before we take a vote. Are we going -- is everyone seated in the chamber going to be the total number, and now that Councilwoman Flood has been dismissed from all proceedings, does that mean 19 is the number and are we all here? I haven't done a count around the room. Is 19 our base number when we determine whether or not we have the simple majority should we choose to take this vote?

CHAIRMAN YATES: It doesn't look like we're missing anybody.

MR. GOLDEN: No. That is -- and 19 is the number.

COUNCIL MEMBER SEXTON SMITH: Thank you.

MS. KENT: Mr. Chair.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Yes, ma'am.

MS. KENT: We will withdraw the motion.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay. Thank you.

Councilman, you're in the queue. Councilman Ackerson, was it over this motion that has just been withdrawn or something else?

COUNCIL MEMBER ACKERSON: It was over clarification on the question Councilwoman Barbara Sexton Smith just asked.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay.

COUNCIL MEMBER ACKERSON: And again, my concern is, just going by the strict statute, the statute says five people proffering the charges shall not be considered part of the body. That leaves 21. I mean, whether you're sick or not, at the end of the day it's very analogous to overturning a Planning Commission vote. It takes 14. It doesn't -- it doesn't -- not a majority of those present, but a majority of the body, and because of the clear language here I've got some concern whether or not our numbers are accurate. And it's important that we have accurate numbers.

MR. GOLDEN: Absolutely. Let me do this: We will recirculate the Court's orders, our opinion letters on the subject, and explain that (1) of 67C.143 defines for us what the Council Court is.

Clearly it -- clearly Council Court consists of a body. It may change from 21 to 10 to 26, depending upon who's being removed. It may also change based upon malice, fraud, or, in this particular case, the emergency nature.

Let me do this: Let me circulate these numbers. The numbers will become germane --

CHAIRMAN YATES: They should be in their documents.

MR. GOLDEN: And -- and --

CHAIRMAN YATES: That's what I'm -- I'm checking with the clerk.

Does the clerk have those orders? Are they -- are they uploaded into our documents?

MR. OTT: Uh-huh.

CHAIRMAN YATES: They should be on your -everyone should be able to pull them up. They're
all -- all available. So if anybody needs those
documents, all you gotta do is click in.

MR. GOLDEN: And they were emailed as they were issued. I'm sure that you all saw a lot of blanket emails coming, both of the parties' original pleading, the response or the other pleading, and the ultimate orders were emailed to everybody as they -- as they were filed by Mr. Ott, so they're

there.

But we will circulate the ones addressed again, just to be sure. With regard to the specific numbers, they'll become germane at the time of the vote on ultimate removal.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And so we've made sure, and counsel both should know that every motion they put in and every ruling has been part of and will be part of the record so that all my colleagues -- so that way a lot of the questions we're having today are repetitive, have already been answered, so if everybody would take the time to please read the motions and the answers, I think that'll save us a lot of time.

Councilwoman Woolridge.

COUNCIL MEMBER WOOLRIDGE: Thank you, Mr. President.

I would like to know from you or from Mr.

Golden, whose rules -- which rule is -- if we have the Council rule and then we have a statute, which one of these rules actually rule? That's what --

CHAIRMAN YATES: The statute is always -- we are preempted from making a Council rule that would be -- that would override a state statute. They would always be bearing. We're created by the state

statue, so theirs would be -- they would always override us. We would be preempted.

COUNCIL MEMBER WOOLRIDGE: Simple answer for me, please, Mr. President. Please. The statute or is it our rule? Which one supersedes the other?

That's --

CHAIRMAN YATES: The statute.

COUNCIL MEMBER WOOLRIDGE: Well, thank you.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Does that make -- that's like when we passed the minimum wage -- well, that was -- that was a -- and then the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that it was in violation and we were preempted. We have to act within state statute. We're created by the state statute and so our rules cannot be in conflict with them.

COUNCIL MEMBER WOOLRIDGE: Well, what -- what --

CHAIRMAN YATES: In the event they are, then the state statute would be -- would be the higher.

COUNCIL MEMBER WOOLRIDGE: Well, then, Mr. President, I think the statute, and I stand to be corrected, says that a removal vote requires a two-thirds vote of the total legislative council.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay. And I know that

hopefully everybody -- and if you click on the documents, there should be the explanation. I could have Mr. Golden give that explanation again to the body, I know he's done it a few times, but it's in the -- sometimes it's easier, because if you read the writing, it's been actually laid out and explained, and so if everybody would kind of take a few minutes this evening and the next day and make sure that -- that you take the time to read the motions and the answers and findings, I think that would give a lot of direction.

Okay. That's -- the Charging Committee has withdrawn their motion for summary judgment.

The next that is before us is the motion for censure and dismissal of removal proceedings and the Council Court order, and that's been filed by the Respondent and counsel.

And just to -- I know I sent that email out explaining, and I know that my colleagues have this information, but I want to go ahead and state for the record that -- verbatim that our rules allow the Respondent to move for summary disposition.

Respondent has asked for the dismissal of the charges against him, having filed a motion to dismiss, and then the Charging Committee responded.

Both parties have filed pleadings in support of their positions.

Pursuant to Rules 4 and 7, a motion to dismiss will require a majority vote by the Council Court stating the charges against Dan Johnson should be dismissed.

And I'll open that for discussion to my colleagues first, if they have questions on that.

Again, this is procedural, so it will be set up for a vote. And again, this would be the Respondent,

Councilman Dan Johnson's -- he has moved for summary disposition.

Seeing no questions, counsel -- would either counsel like to make a brief argument or statement concerning this?

MR. MCADAM: I would.

Mr. President, Mrs. Kent, ladies and gentlemen of the Louisville Metro Council Court, at the risk of sounding impertinent, I'm going to guess not many of us want to be here this afternoon. Most of us have lives, a lot better way to spend an afternoon than to sit in judgment of our colleagues. But here we are.

I think this is a situation that has kind of got out of hand, to be perfectly blunt about it, and

I think my Motion Number 1 may be the solution that you're looking for.

I don't know what happened at Wyandotte Park.

I wasn't there. Some of you were. A lot of people were there, nobody saw it. But whatever it was,

Councilwoman Jessica Green was offended by something that Councilman Johnson did or said, and she sent a confidential memorandum to some people in the leadership. Somehow or another it ended up on the front page of the newspaper, and then all sorts of people started getting involved, and constant pounding in the newspaper and on the television and, well, so there we are, we're having an impeachment hearing.

Back -- I don't know. I've spent a lot of time in this chamber over the years, and most of it more enjoyable than -- than tonight, or this afternoon. It used to be that if a -- if a lady or a gentleman did something or said something that was offensive to another lady or gentleman, they would have it brought to their attention, they would apologize, and then the lady or gentleman that was offended would graciously accept the apology. Apparently we don't do that anymore.

Mr. Johnson, Councilman Johnson, has

apologized several times. He was told if he apologized this would all go away. He did that. Said, "Well, if you'd apologize in writing, it will go away." He did that. Said, "Well, if he'd agree to go to counseling, it'll go away." He did that.

The President just sent out a proposal to try to arrive at a compromise settlement, and we accepted most of it and responded. The Charging Committee won't even talk about it. They said it's dead on arrival. A nonstarter, I believe Mrs. Kent said.

So nowadays we don't apologize and accept apologies, we go to court, we sue each other. And you're saying, "Isn't that the guy that sent out the letters to cease and desist?" Yep.

That's the problem with lawyers. When you've only got one tool in your -- in your bag and it's a hammer, everything looks like a nail. But sometimes you don't have to hit everything with a hammer.

Sometimes there's a way to accomplish things without dragging dirty laundry out for the whole world to see.

The Charging Committee will have you believe that you've only got one tool, and that's the quillotine, right? You either find him completely

innocent of any wrongdoing or you cut off his head.

Metaphorically. The only punishment is the death sentence. There are no misdemeanors, there are only felonies. Any violation, any offense, somebody gets their feelings hurt, you lose your job, you lose your career, you lose your livelihood, you overturn a democratic election. You substitute your judgment for the will of the people of the 21st District, the people who have returned him to office nine times.

What was his last majority? 85 percent? Sometimes he doesn't even have opposition.

Here's what I want to propose to you: A wise man said one time the punishment should fit the crime. Actually, it was Pat Mulvihill, Counselor, who said that. And he's exactly right. The punishment should fit the crime.

Did Dan Johnson steal money? Did he assault somebody? Did he -- I mean, it seems to me there ought to be a middle way, something short of decapitation. There ought to be a compromise. And that's what my Motion Number 1 is.

What I'm saying in Motion Number 1 is that he be censured, that this body go on record and say whatever conduct that he did, whether it was intentional or accidental, whatever, it was

offensive. A reasonable person would find it offensive. And it embarrassed the Council. And he ought to be chastised for that.

So he could be publicly censured, and I -the words I use, "for conduct tending to bring
himself and the Louisville Metro Council into
disrepute, dishonor, and ignominy." You might have
to look that one up. The matter of the removal
proceedings are hereby dismissed.

In other words, you agree to censure him publicly and then let's stop all this silliness.

Let's stop the circus before the clowns get in.

See this book (indicating)? This is just -this is just part of the documents that we've
exchanged in this thing so far. I don't want to
make a career out of this, and you don't either.
You don't want to be here. Maybe -- well, maybe
something -- I can't speak for the Charging
Committee.

This isn't about vengeance. This is about what's the reasonable way that we can let the community know that maybe there's some behavior that shouldn't be countenanced. We've all done stupid things. We've all said stupid things. We have all, at one time or another in our lives, done something

that gave somebody offense. Always. Did we lose our job over it?

And let's face it -- let's say that
everything that Jessica Green says happened
happened. Okay? She could have taken a warrant for
him for assault, sexual harassment. What do you
think he -- you think he'd lose his job over that?
You think he'd go to jail? You think he'd get
anything other than a hundred-dollar fine suspended?
Of course not.

Or she could have sued him in civil court. When the jury stopped laughing, do you think that there would have been any monetary judgment for something like that? Okay.

But you have the power -- you have more than power, you have the duty to sit in judgment of him and say whether or not he's going to lose his job, say whether or not you're going to overturn an election. That's pretty serious stuff.

Here's what I'm thinking: You can add to this. You can amend this motion. You can add some things like -- like President Yates suggested, some rules. He has to advise people 30 -- 30 minutes before he gets here, he has to leave 30 minutes after the last hearing. He only comes down to City

Hall when there's a committee meeting or when there's a general meeting of the Council. He conducts all his other business through his aides and on the telephone. He agrees not to have any face-to-face confrontation with the aggrieved parties. And he agrees not to run for reelection in 2018. He's already said that, but you could -- you could make that a part of the stipulation in this. You can make that a part of the order. He will agree to it. Okay?

That seems to accomplish a lot. That shows that you take these charges seriously. It shows that you have a little bit of compassion and you don't cut his head off for something that, in the great scheme of things, when we got dead bodies out on the street -- in the great scheme of things is a relatively minor incident.

So I think you could do that. That cuts this thing short. We don't go through all the silliness of the witnesses and the testimony and the -- there's going to be some hard feelings. I mean, there's going to be some things said that, you know, maybe people will regret later.

This legislative body that you're a member of

and its predecessor, the Louisville Board of
Aldermen, has a proud and noble history of doing
good for this community. We're the first city in
the South to have a public accommodations ordinance,
the first city in the house [sic] to have an open
housing ordinance. We integrated our schools here
in Louisville before Brown versus Education. We
were one of the first states -- cities in the -- in
the South, at least, to have a fairness ordinance.

Isn't that what you want to be remembered for? Isn't that what you want to be remembered for, for the good that this body has done for the community? We got a lot of problems out there. You know. Your phone rings off the hook, you know what problems we got. And the people who put you here are looking to you for solutions. They want you to help them with their problems instead of this silly distraction. This doesn't make anybody look good.

Nobody's -- win, lose, or draw, nobody's going to come out of this thing looking good.

So I'm asking you to do the brave thing. I'm asking you to get some courage. Okay? Because here's what's going to happen: You vote for Motion Number 1, and you can add some stuff in there if you want, and this thing's over with. And tomorrow Phil

Bailey will write an article saying that you're all 1 2 a bunch of cowards and you've let the women down and 3 this is gonna be -- there's gonna be rapes in the 4 halls and stuff like that, and then the next day, 5 you know --MR. STEWART: Object. 6 7 MR. MCADAM: -- you'll get slimed in the -in the --8 9 MS. KENT: Mr. Chair --MR. MCADAM: -- Courier. 10 MS. KENT: -- I object. We're talking about 11 12 rape in the halls. Where is this going? We're 13 talking about the glorious history of the Board of 14 Aldermen. 15 CHAIRMAN YATES: I know --16 MS. KENT: Where is this heading? 17 CHAIRMAN YATES: I know your objection. 18 If you can, if you would stay on focus and --19 MR. MCADAM: Okay. What I'm saying --20 CHAIRMAN YATES: -- stay on your motion. 21 MR. MCADAM: What I'm saying is --22 CHAIRMAN YATES: And also, I have people that 23 are popping the queue. What I'm going to do is, I'm

going to allow Ms. Kent to respond and then I'll

address all our motions in the queue.

24

25

MR. MCADAM: Okay. What I'm saying is, in a week, ten days, this will be forgotten. There will be new news in the newspaper. There will be new people to be vilified in the Courier-Journal. A year from now nobody will remember it. A year from now Dan will be gone and you will be able to go out -- and you're all going to be running for -- well, half of you will be running for reelection in a year. You'll be able to go tell your constituents, "Look, this is the good things we did. These are the things we've built. These are the laws that we passed. This is how we've benefited the community."

Let's put this thing behind you. Vote for Motion Number 1 to censure Dan Johnson. Let's get on with the business the people elected you for.

Thanks for your attention.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Thank you, Counsel.

MS. KENT: Mr. Chair, and I'll be pretty
brief. First of all, this motion is not appropriate
at all. There is no censure. In the past we -- a
councilwoman actually resigned before the
proceedings began and the proceedings went on,
because the Council Court was told once it starts,
you cannot stop the removal proceedings.

But more important is this -- where the

Respondent's trying to push this. This -- the

Respondent talks about aggrieved parties and

offended women. This is much greater than what

happened with Councilwoman Green and Erin Leet, and

so to try minimize it and call this silliness

because of an apology and how ladies and gentlemen

act in public I think show a deliberate

misunderstanding of what this removal proceeding is

about.

The reason -- there's a reason that censure is not available. Because censure is a form of punishment. What's happening here, the Respondent is saying, "I'll take punishment from you for my bad deeds." That's not what a removal proceeding is about. It's about housekeeping. It's not about a Council member getting vengeance against another Council member, it's about the reputation of the Council in the community and it's how the Council maintains the public trust.

A removal is a -- is intended to remove the elected official who is violating that public trust and thereby bringing shame upon the Council.

It's not about seeking vengeance. And he did say that and I agree, this is not about vengeance.

This is about how do we continue to operate? What do we do to remove a problem that has been growing over the past couple of years and getting worse all the time?

So I think to offer to take a punishment is not allowed under the statute because punishment is not the intent. The intent is not to punish one member, the intent is for 25 members to be in the community, hold their head up high, not get teased about the latest exposure, not get teased about the latest attack, but just to be able to carry on the business in the district without having to account for a colleague who is not performing up to the standard that his peers try to maintain.

Fail? We all do. But we all try to be truthful, to be honest, to be civil, to respect the institutions that we serve.

And so this is greater than just Dan -
Councilman Johnson saying, "I'll agree I've been a

bad boy, so you can put me in the corner, you can

punish me." No. That's not what the intent is.

The intent is to get the Council back -- to remove a

distraction, to remove an embarrassment that impedes

the work of the Council, that continually presents

the appearance that the members of the Metro Council

simply aren't capable of maintaining the public's 1 2 trust. 3 Thank you. 4 CHAIRMAN YATES: Thank you. 5 Mr. Adams [sic], I'll allow a very short response if you want, one or two minutes. 6 7 (Mr. McAdam shook head.) 8 CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay. Set it up for 9 discussion amongst the Council Court. 10 Councilwoman Butler. COUNCIL MEMBER BUTLER: Thank you, Mr. 11 President. 12 I make a motion that we go into closed 13 14 session per KRS 61.810(1)(k) for attorney-client 15 privilege. I believe this Court has some questions 16 for the County Attorney that we need to ask in 17 closed question -- in closed court. COUNCIL MEMBER BRYANT HAMILTON: Second. 18 19 CHAIRMAN YATES: Second. All those in favor, signify by saying aye. 20 21 (Vote.) 22 CHAIRMAN YATES: Those opposed. 23 The ayes have it. We will now entertain a 24 motion to go into closed session. 25 (Closed session from 3:16 p.m. to 6:05 p.m.)

CHAIRMAN YATES: I'll entertain a motion to go out of executive session.

COUNCIL MEMBER PEDEN: So moved.

COUNCIL MEMBER AUBREY WELCH: Second.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay. Moved and seconded.

There's no official Council business discussed in executive session outside of the Court tribunal issue.

Mr. McAdams [sic], I understand that before this Court you have an amendment by substitution on the stipulation and agreed order.

MR. MCADAM: That's correct, Mr. President.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And that has now been -- a copy has been handed out to each member here in this body and given to the clerk.

Mr. Clerk, would you please read in the record, so we have that, this stipulation and agreed order?

MR. OTT: (Reading) In the Matter of the Removal Charges Against District 21 Councilman Dan Johnson. Stipulation and Agreed Order. Comes the Charging Committee, by counsel, and the Respondent, Dan Johnson, by counsel, and for their stipulation and agreed order in the above-referenced matter, they respectfully submit the following to the

Council Court for review and approval.

Stipulations: Respondent Dan Johnson hereby waives all right to a full public hearing provided under KRS Subsection 67C.143, Section 2.

The parties stipulate that KRS Subsection 67C.143 does not allow for any discipline of its members short of removal.

The parties further agree that questions arising because of the Kentucky General Assembly's recent amendments to KRS Subsection 67C.143 jeopardize the swift and efficient administration of this removal hearing which will likely result in costly appeals borne by the taxpayers.

Respondent admits to both transgressions and wrongdoings and stipulates that there is sufficient evidence against him warranting removal.

And Respondent Dan Johnson stipulates that he is subject to removal in this matter, that his stipulations may be used against him, and agrees to consent to his removal under the below conditions.

Based upon these stipulation, the parties agree that Dan Johnson's removal be stayed conditioned solely upon the following:

Dan Johnson will be permitted in Old City
Hall only during the 20 minutes before, during, and

the 20 minutes after regularly scheduled committee meetings and Council meetings and at all other times shall remain off the premises of Metro Council.

Dan Johnson shall be permitted to accomplish any other Metro Council business of which he has an interest from his home, including participating in Council-related meetings by conference call.

Dan Johnson shall be free to vote on any matter and engage in any public debate.

Dan Johnson shall not attend any ceremonial functions outside District 21, where it can be assumed he represents Louisville Metro Council.

Dan Johnson agrees that any intentional or accidental exposure of his genitals or buttock will result in review by the triumvirate -- I apologize -- established under paragraph 13.

Other than with his own personnel, Dan

Johnson is not to initiate contact with any other

Metro Council member or staffer except by phone or

email. Nothing within this prohibition shall limit

Dan Johnson's aforementioned rights to debate or to

express an opinion on any matter in a forum or

session of Metro Council.

Dan Johnson agrees to comply with the Louisville Metro Code of Ethics, Metro Council

rules, and Metro Council policies and procedures fully and shall comport himself in such a manner as to not bring scorn or disrepute on his office, Metro Council, the Louisville Metro Government, or the people whom he serves.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

A councilperson selected by the Charging Committee, a councilperson selected by the Respondent, but not the Respondent, and a councilperson selected by the Council President shall act as a triumvirate reviewing Dan Johnson's conduct and comportment for the balance of his term. Any finding by a two-third majority of this triumvirate -- I'm not saying that right -- that Dan Johnson has violated the letter or spirit of this agreement will result in his immediate and summary The Respondent waives any right to appeal this triumvirate's decision and will abide by any finding that they may issue. The Respondent hereby irrevocably waives its rights under KRS 67C.143 for a removal hearing or appeal in any action or proceeding arising out of this agreement for the transactions relating to its subject matter. clear, there will be no trial or appeal of the decision by the triumvirate.

Dan Johnson agrees to obtain staff and

volunteer approval from the triumvirate. 1 2 Dan Johnson agrees not to run for Louisville 3 Metro Council. Read in full. 4 5 CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay. It's been properly 6 presented before us. 7 May I have a motion to accept? 8 UNIDENTIFIED COUNCIL MEMBER: So moved. 9 CHAIRMAN YATES: May I have a second? 10 COUNCIL MEMBER BENSON: Second. 11 CHAIRMAN YATES: Properly moved and seconded. 12 This is just the amendment to substitute the stipulation and agreed order so read for us. All 13 14 those in favor, respond by saying aye. 15 (Vote.) CHAIRMAN YATES: Those opposed? 16 17 The ayes have it, the stipulation and 18 agreement before us. 19 Colleagues, is there any discussion on the 20 stipulation and agreed order? It's been read into 21 the record. 22 MS. KENT: Your Honor -- Mr. Chair, if I may 23 speak. 24 CHAIRMAN YATES: You may. 25 MS. KENT: Let me first say I don't

understand how it is that this removal hearing ends with this agreed order without the Charging

Committee having -- not having been given what we were so concerned about previously on the summary judgment motion, and that's the right to a full hearing.

CHAIRMAN YATES: And I'll let -- I'll let the County Attorney first answer that question as it legally -- and we'll do it in pieces, because I think that people will click in, and I'll want to make sure, before we go to a vote, there's people in the queue as well.

So the first question was: How does that proceed without the full hearing and why is it different for the Charging Committee as compared to the -- or the --

MR. GOLDEN: So, Deborah, if we take a look at (2), the elected officer has the right for removal, and no elected officer shall be removed without being given the full public hearing. All right? So that the --

MS. KENT: I understand that.

MR. GOLDEN: -- statutorily there is a right.

I think that that same confident and right doesn't exist under the statute.

MS. KENT: I believe there is a duty of fair play, of fairness, and I find this to be incredibly unfair that the Charging Committee has been working all of this time and the people who are expecting to hear the charges and hear the evidence, your constituents, I don't think this is fair to them either.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

With that said, I have to say that I'm astonished that the Council Court would even consider this. I think that what you are being lured into doing is condoning behavior that has been -- that has been shown all across the country, with all types, whether it's Bill O'Reilly or Harvey Weinstein, those organizations removed the offending party, but here at the Metro Council, you're going to condone this, and you're going to condone this based on an agreement that you know is worthless. You know that there have been promises made, there have been apologies made and then apologies withdrawn and denied. I don't know why you think this is going to work any better, because I think everybody just rolls over and goes back to sleep and carries on, business as is. We've accepted the fact Dan will be Dan.

And I want to know what happens now, not with

this triumvirate, but with the next victim and with the liability. You worry about appeals, you worry about the cost of the trial, but what's the liability of this Council and this government when you've not addressed this problem, this problem that begins with total disrespect for women and expands outward to demonstrate total disrespect for this Council, for the Democratic Caucus, for the Office of the President, for all the people who have tried, tried to resolve this before it got to the point of removal.

And I find it astonishing that if nothing worked in June and nothing worked in July and nothing worked in August and nothing worked in September, why you think this is going to work.

I find this extremely disappointing. I know the members of the Charging Committee have never anticipated anything but removal. That's why they went to a removal proceeding. And because they stood up, they had the guts, they took on the work, now you think you have an agreement that will stick when you've tried it individually, an institution of the Council such as the Caucus tried to work out a resolution. That didn't work. The Council President tries to limit the damage. That didn't

work. But suddenly this is going to work? I don't know why you believe that.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And let me make sure that you remove "Comes the Charging Committee" from this document. The Charging Committee has not agreed to any of this and does not plan to agree to any of this.

And with that said, my last question is:

There will be a roll call vote on this, will there
not?

There will be. CHAIRMAN YATES: Counsel, if I may just respond briefly. There is in this signed agreement, based on the stipulation that has now been signed by Councilman Johnson and Tom McAdams [sic], this Council has received an opinion from the County Attorney Mike O'Connell's office which advises us that even if we go through these proceedings and we go through the entire process and we spend the hundreds of thousands of dollars and the time and call the witnesses, even if we do that, we've been advised that more likely than not there will be a stay and that Councilman Johnson will, in essence, never really be removed from this Council, and that it potentially would exceed the time that he is here, because of the timing in which he has to leave his term, and so that -- we do have a written

opinion with that, and so I think that this goes into the forefront.

As far as the matters, you're absolutely correct that I have tried to mediate this and it did not work. There was not an agreement between the parties, whether the Charging Committee or Councilman Johnson, to it. At this point it was presented — this is the way it was explained: It was presented — the Charging Committee brought the charges to the Council, the Council Court made that decision, and then it was presented to the Council Court. Councilman Johnson for the first time has agreed to these terms just now.

And what was explained, that in the event that now if there's a violation of these principles, there will be a removal, and there'll -- and it'll happen instantaneously, without the need of the Council Court, and he's forfeited his right to appeal.

So in essence, by signing this agreement, if Councilman Johnson does anything else, that is the only way he will be removed.

In the event that we went through the proceedings and Councilman Johnson does not do this, Councilman Johnson -- and even if everything gets

proven, in that light, Councilman Johnson stays on this Council to the end. That's what's been explained.

And if the County Attorney wants to explain that better, that's fine, but this -- so with that information -- and this Council Court is also individual Council members who have had, obviously, besides just being a jury, somewhat, in there, has to weigh what is the endgame. If we spend the hundreds of thousands of dollars and the time and we call the witnesses in -- and nobody in here wants to call that young lady from GLI and have her named. There are so many things that -- so we had to figure out what the endgame is. That was part of the discussion.

So I wanted to make sure that you understood that, I wanted to make sure the Charging Committee understood that. And that's what we heard through there, and based on that information that's been received to us, that -- that's how we're here.

Now, no vote has been taken, there are some people coming in the queue, but I wanted to at least set the stage.

That document will be put into the record, so you'll have a copy of that too, and not -- no,

not the appeal letter, no, because that would be work product from the County Attorney's Office.

But that has been -- that was made clear to this body. That is our legal counsel, and we are -- we would have to follow the advice of the legal counsel and assume that their opinion is correct.

While you may disagree with that, that that is where we're at.

Councilwoman Parker.

COUNCIL MEMBER PARKER: Yes. Thank you.

I think this sets a terrible precedent for this body and I will not be voting for it.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Councilman Ackerson.

A couple things. One is, much as when we were talking about summary dispositions earlier and my position was Councilman Johnson deserved his day, well, on that same thought process is, I think the voters of Metro Louisville and I think the Charging Committee deserve their day to let the facts play out.

Ultimately what we've heard here is we've heard the argument that on one hand this doesn't remove Councilman Johnson. On the other hand, had

he appealed this, the odds are he wouldn't have gotten removed anyway. So the endgame was Dan Johnson would still be sitting in this chair, period, under either procedure, but at least the charging party would have had their opportunity to proffer the evidence. The evidence — the community would have then seen what was real evidence and what wasn't real evidence. You know, what was — you know, was there substantiation of these charges. That will not come into play now.

Finally, I have a disagreement with the ruling of this body on the number of votes needed. Pursuant to 67C.143, I'm of the opinion that it takes two-thirds of this body less the Charging Committee and the person. Even though one Council member is not here, that takes us down to 19, at the end of the day it should be two-thirds of 20, because the statute doesn't say two-thirds of those present, it says two-thirds of the Council excluding the people that it listed as the Charging Committee.

So I will be a no vote on this, but I wanted to explain my position to my constituents and to my voters out there and let them know that I think that the evidence should have been put forth, the same -- for the same reason that Councilman Johnson should

not have had a summary judgment against him, he should have been able to defend himself, the evidence should have been allowed to come out and play out, so --

CHAIRMAN YATES: Thank you, Councilman.

And in this agreement, this is, in essence, a guilty plea in which it actually stipulates that the evidence presented is correct.

And there's also a Number 3, and that was the other thing that some colleagues thought was material to put in there, is that because of the General Assembly's recent amendments to KRS 67C there's a jeopardize the swift and efficient administration of removal, which likely there will be an issue there, because it is -- just like you said, there's some question over the number. There are some things that are not clear in this body.

And so there is a stipulation of where

Councilman Johnson has before this body, before the

constituent base, and before the community has

stipulated what he had done. That's the first time

that he has done that. He signed his name, put it

in writing, and I know that was very important to

many members, including members of the Charging

Committee early on, before this process began, and I

think that it's important now that this be in writing, that there is a stipulation that he did make violations as laid out here.

Kevin Kramer. Councilman Kramer.

COUNCIL MEMBER KRAMER: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I've tried to get in the habit of -- because

I have a tendency to just speak, to not repeat what
others said, but I think tonight's vote is such that
it demands some repetition. We refused to accept a
summary judgment to convict. It seems only
appropriate then that they would we would refuse to
accept a summary judgment to dismiss or to accept
anything less.

Councilman Johnson refused to accept responsibility and acknowledge what he did. That may be because he didn't do those things. At this point we don't know. We don't know what he did, we just know that he is willing to accept this deal tonight. We don't know if he's accepting the deal to cover up the evidence or if it's just to keep his job.

You know, the President says that he's accepting the evidence. Well, he is, but we haven't seen the evidence. All we've seen is the charges, so we don't know if he's innocent or not, we only

know he's willing to accept a deal. And we don't know if he's willing to accept a deal because he wants to keep the evidence private or if he's willing to accept the deal because he wants to keep his job, and this could go either way.

Our responsibility, I believe, is to hear all of the evidence and do the best we can to remain objective through the entire process and make a vote based on what's presented.

And I know folks have made decisions, I know a lot of conversations have been had, I know it's been in papers all over the place. I know every one of us, when we go out in public, somebody has some comment. I know that's hard, but I think we owe it to our constituents to at least make an effort to do our job, and that is to hear the evidence and do the best we can based on the evidence, and that's hard -- I know it's hard to do because there's a lot out there, but do the best we can based on the evidence to make a decision.

And if there is evidence that suggests that it's as bad as we're being told by the Charging Committee, then maybe removal is appropriate. If there isn't sufficient evidence, as Councilman Johnson assures us there's not, then maybe we should

agree that he's innocent and move on.

If he's innocent, he deserves to have the evidence exonerate him, and if he's not, then I think as a Council Court we're obligated to know the details of the guilt in order to determine what our next right step should be.

So I'm going to have a hard time voting -actually, I'm not going to have a hard time voting
yes because I'm not going to vote yes, and I'm going
to implore my colleagues who are considering a yes
vote to reconsider. I know we're being told that
there's some expense, I know we're being told that
there may or may not be -- well, we're being told
that there will be an appeal. You know, we do
things on this Council all the time that we know may
end up in an appeal, and the reality is, some things
there's going to be an appeal regardless how we
vote.

So I just don't know that making the argument that an appeal is a reason not to move forward. I think we have an obligation to do -- to do the right thing, I think we have the obligation to hear the facts and make as informed a decision as we can make, and I think this is unfortunately another instance where we choose not to get all the

information because we've already made up our minds and we don't want to be bothered with what might be out there that might change our minds, and I just think we should at least try to stay open-minded.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Thank you, Councilman.

It's Number 4 where it does state "Respondent admits to both transgressions and wrongdoings and stipulates that there is sufficient evidence against him warranting removal." So that is a stipulation.

COUNCIL MEMBER KRAMER: Then, Mr. President, if I may, we don't know what that evidence is, we just know he stipulated to it, and how do we know that he's not just trying to keep the evidence from becoming public?

CHAIRMAN YATES: No, but in the event -- he has the right to a hearing. In the event that he wants to waive that and stipulate in an agreement that he is waiving that and he is pleading otherwise that we are correct.

Councilwoman Barbara Shanklin.

COUNCIL MEMBER SHANKLIN: Thank you, Mr. President.

You know, this is a really hard vote for me.

I mean, when I say that, I mean it's a hard vote

because I've been in this situation.

But at one point I was under the impression that everybody had agreed to some type of a deal except two people on the Charging Committee. I see you shaking your head, but you were one of the people that said no. But I was under the impression there was only two people that said they would not be willing to do this, and the rest of them were willing to -- you know, to.

But like I said, it's very hard for me, but I just have to make a decision and stick with it.

I would love to see Mr. Johnson stay on because he's -- the type of person he is, he's never given me a problem or anything, but I know there's been some problems over the years.

So as I said, it's hard. It's hard for me just to be here, and I didn't want to be here.

So I don't know which way I'll go, but I'll make that decision in a minute.

MS. KENT: Mr. Chair, could I clarify something about that, the Charging Committee?

CHAIRMAN YATES: I think your Charging

Committee clarified it pretty good from behind me.

MS. KENT: Okay.

CHAIRMAN YATES: But go ahead.

MS. KENT: There has never, ever been any

wavering on the part of the Charging Committee. All five members have been very clear. They began a removal proceeding, they intended to see it through the end, just as the expectation was that those people on the Democratic Caucus who voted for the resolution and said in that resolution if there is no resignation by August 1, we, the Democratic Caucus, will proceed to removal.

But there has never been any wavering with the Charging Committee. When the Court ordered that we attempt mediation, we in good faith did that because that was the Court order. And we have followed the Court's rules, we have followed the Court's procedures, and that's -- and it didn't do any good, and that's one of the reasons I don't know why you're going to depend on this document, because the rules, for example --

CHAIRMAN YATES: Thank you, Counsel.

Councilwoman Julie Denton.

COUNCIL MEMBER DENTON: Thank you, Mr. President.

Almost a week ago this body -- or almost two weeks ago this body unanimously voted for Marsy's law so that victims could have their day in court, could have a say, could be kept current as to what's

going on, and today what we're doing doesn't feel like we meant what our vote stated previously.

The folks on the Charging Committee, the folks who have been potential victims in this particular situation have not had the ability to have their day in court, so to speak.

You know, I've heard people say, "Oh, this could last three weeks. It could take a lot of time. We all have better things we'd rather be doing."

Well, sure. Nobody wants to sit here for hours on end and participate in this, but that's why we're here is to do the tough jobs. If it was easy, everybody would do this. And it's not easy. It's a tough job. This is a difficult situation that nobody wants to be in, but we are.

And I think what Councilman Kramer said, that you've gotta be fair to all sides so that the facts are out there and people can make a determination.

My preference would have been that we would have had that, and then we would have decided whether there was guilt or not, and then if we decided -- if the body had decided they wanted to take an agreement, maybe at that point that would have been a better opportunity, but I think that it's premature to do

this.

And I'll have to say, it just -- this is not how this body has operated before. And whatever Councilman Johnson would decide to do, if he were to be voted off, that's a decision he'd have to make, but we can't always make our decisions based upon what somebody else might do. And I just feel like this is an abdication of our duties, which is why I'm going to be voting no.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Thank you, Councilwoman.

And I will clarify, because -- I'll make sure there's no misinformation out there as far as Chair and Mediator, or I did try to encourage mediation discussion. I know there was a mediation, I appreciate all parties participating in that, and also a -- I did put together a proposed stipulation that I presented to all parties and tried to keep that conversation going back and forth, so I do believe there may have been some misinformation in the media that was put out that that was proposed by the Charging Committee, and that was not. That was proposed by my chair of just -- as just things that the parties may consider of reaching an agreement and tried to encourage that open communication continuously, especially in light of

the opinion of the County Attorney and the changes to KRS, kind of debacle on knowing what the numbers of the removals are and the other things, I was hoping that the parties would continue that open negotiation.

At that time the parties were the Charging Committee and Councilman Johnson. At the time when the removal hearing began and they swore a Council Court, then all of a sudden that decision was between the Council Court and Councilman Johnson, and so continued that negotiation. The Charging Committee, they filed the charges. The five members brought it to the Council Court, the Council Court participated in that negotiation back and forth, and that's where the vote will come today.

Councilman Bill Hollander.

COUNCIL MEMBER HOLLANDER: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Let me just correct the record for a minute.

What the Democratic Caucus said was that if

Councilman Johnson did not resign, there would be a removal action by members of our caucus. And in fact, three members of our caucus did, in fact, file a removal action, just as we said they would.

I thank them for doing that, because had they

not done that and brought us to this day, we would not be having this rather extraordinarily -- extraordinary stipulation in which guilt essentially is admitted and in which Councilman Johnson's behavior in this building and elsewhere for the remainder of his term is severely limited.

When we say what makes us think it will be followed, there's a triumvirate established, and if two members of that triumvirate don't think it's being followed, he will be summarily removed. He signed that stipulation. I mean, that's an extraordinary document. We won't be having another trial, he will be summarily removed. We will not be paying an attorney to do that, but he will be summarily removed.

And had we not had the Charging Committee filing this action, we would not be in this position. So I thank them for their work. I think exactly what the Democratic Caucus said would happen has happened, there was a removal action filed, and we're now in a situation in which really some -- I would encourage anybody in the public to really read the stipulation, because it is frankly extraordinary and extremely stringent.

I'll be voting yes.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Thank you, Councilman.

Councilman Kramer, you're back in the queue.

COUNCIL MEMBER KRAMER: I am. Thank you, Mr. President, Mr. Chair at this point.

The public will have every opportunity to see exactly the document that we are discussing, and it is -- it does limit the Councilman from District 21 very severely, which begs the question for the folks who live in District 22 -- I mean District 21.

District 22 is not at issue here.

It begs the question for the folks who live in District 21, do they have full Council representation or not? They have full Council representation for 20 minutes before and 20 minutes after in any meeting he happens to attend. They have full Council representation from the Councilman's home, should he work from there. They have full Council representation at ceremonial events in District 21 but not anywhere else.

You know, I have to wonder, if I'm a constituent in District 21, am I getting the same level of representation as every other citizen in this community? And if the answer to that is no, who's responsible for that?

If Councilman Johnson is guilty of the things

he has done allegedly, he's guilty of those things, and his victims should get justice, and his constituents should not be forced to continue on with a councilperson who is guilty of those kinds of activities.

If he's not guilty -- which we just keep skipping over that. If he's not guilty, then his constituents absolutely should have an expectation that their Council member is just as available and just as active as any other councilperson in this building.

Every one of us in this room, the 19 of us sitting on the Charging Committee -- on the Council Court and the five members of the Charging Committee, every one of us has to acknowledge that there are conversations that take place in this building in hallways and in elevators that help inform us on issues that are before this body. If a person is limited not by their choice but by ours, we are limiting the ability for them to perform their responsibilities.

It means that they're now going to have to make a phone call to talk to somebody about an issue that they may not even have thought they needed to talk to someone about.

I'm not advocating that you change the stipulations and say Councilman Johnson is free to roam about the building whenever he wants to. I understand why that stipulation is there, but I also believe if that's -- if, in fact, he's guilty and that stipulation is necessary, then the constituents of District 21 don't have a full representative on this Council anymore, and I -- again, I implore my colleagues, please think hard about what it is you're doing tonight.

If there is evidence sufficient to suggest that there are victims here who deserve our protection, we should be protecting them. If there isn't sufficient evidence for that, then the constituents in District 21 deserve to have a fully functioning Council member.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Thank you, Councilman.

And as was discussed and explained in legal opinion, you're absolutely correct that any victims deserve us to protect them, and what has been explained to us, that this stipulation and agreement provides oversight and protections within this body.

If we play politics and we cast the political vote and go through the process and we vote to remove, there are no stipulations, there are no

agreement, and there are no control. There's no time period in which to control and there is no protection for any victims. So I would hope that -- and I believe that is actually what is in the forefront of almost everyone's mind, but thank you for bringing that about.

Councilwoman Barbara Shanklin.

COUNCIL MEMBER SHANKLIN: Thank you, Mr. President.

Sitting here thinking about it, if Dan has already admitted guilt, there's no way in the world he can have a fair trial now. So maybe think about that. Once you've already admitted guilt, you can't have a fair trial, so --

CHAIRMAN YATES: Now, he has signed this agreement and stipulation agreement and thrown it on the mercy of the Council Court; that's correct.

Councilwoman Julie Denton again.

COUNCIL MEMBER DENTON: Following up to

Councilwoman Shanklin's comment just now, the

admission of guilt, if this -- if the vote is lost

on this and it does not prevail, then wouldn't -
would that admission of guilt then be used to -- in

the trial?

CHAIRMAN YATES: No. Right now this is a

stipulation and agreed order. If it's -- if it is agreed to by this body, then the trial will be over and this -- all -- this will be implemented immediately. The three persons will be put together and also these restrictions and oversight will be implemented immediately. In the event they vote no, we'll proceed forward with the trial.

COUNCIL MEMBER DENTON: So this really is not an admission of guilt? Is that what you're saying?

CHAIRMAN YATES: It is an agreement, an admission, if we accept it. If we do not accept it, it's no longer binding, if it does not accept it.

It's up to this body to accept this stipulation and agreed order would be an admission.

COUNCIL MEMBER DENTON: I'm not an attorney.

It just seems like an admission -- if you sign something that says, "I admit I did these things and that there is evidence to show," unlike -- and not being an attorney, I know enough about an Alford plea to be dangerous, but my understanding is that's only saying that there's enough evidence to convict you, but you're maintaining your innocence, and this is -- am I correct on that?

CHAIRMAN YATES: You are correct.

COUNCIL MEMBER DENTON: Okay.

CHAIRMAN YATES: This is not an Alford plea --

COUNCIL MEMBER DENTON: I'm not --

COUNCIL MEMBER DENTON: And that's why I'm questioning you. If he is willing to sign that yes, he agrees that he's guilty of everything that's in what the Charging Committee submitted, and he's willing to sign it, is that not an admission of guilt?

CHAIRMAN YATES: No. This is a document that's been tendered to us to accept. In the event that we accept it as well, then it would be something entered in the record.

I know as a layperson, in a lay stance that you would say that there's an admission. It would be not -- it would not be admitted to this Council Court in the event we did not accept it.

COUNCIL MEMBER DENTON: Well, I just want everybody to be clear: If I hadn't done anything, I sure as heck wouldn't be signing something that said I did it.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Sure. And I think that's -COUNCIL MEMBER DENTON: So I think --

McLENDON-KOGUT REPORTING SERVICE, LLC (502) 585-5634

CHAIRMAN YATES: -- the idea. I think he's agreed -
COUNCIL MEMBER DENTON: -- this is --

 $\label{eq:chairman yates: -- stipulated that he's done } % \end{substitute} % \end{substitute} % % \end{substitute} % \end{su$ 

it just doesn't make a whole lot of sense. I -this just seems unusual that we let him agree that
yes, he's done these things and then we don't
continue on with the trial. Right. But I'm just
saying if we didn't accept it, I don't know how,
going back to what --

CHAIRMAN YATES: I think your mike's still on.

COUNCIL MEMBER DENTON: Right. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN YATES: All right. Hearing no other discussion, the matter before this Council at this time is still the stipulation and agreed order that's been brought before us on a motion, second, approval, was the amended -- amended -- the amended stipulations, which has been -- do you have -- Councilwoman --

MS. KENT: Yes, Mr. Chair.

CHAIRMAN YATES: -- I mean, Counsel. It's bad in this chamber.

MS. KENT: Don't promote me.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Depends on the day.

MS. KENT: I just want to be very clear about something, and I think you may need to get an amendment or edit the document, but this is not an agreed order that includes the Charging Committee, so I don't know that the word "agreed" should be in there. I think perhaps stipulation and order. And again, "Comes the Charging Committee," I cannot be in there.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay. And --

MS. KENT: This is -- the Charging Committee has not agreed, does not want this to be made out to look like they were part of this agreement. If the Council Court is going to conditionally dismiss the charges, then that's what Council Court should vote on, a conditioned dismissal --

CHAIRMAN YATES: Without a --

 $\mbox{MS. KENT: } \mbox{ $--$ a dismissal order with } \\ \mbox{conditions, but $--$}$ 

CHAIRMAN YATES: I can --

MS. KENT: -- agreed order is misleading.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Okay. Without objection, just to clarify, because I know that is obviously -- the Council could -- I guess the legal was that it's

within the Council and it's represented by this body, but I think the easiest way to do it is just to strike if --

MR. MCADAM: We can --

CHAIRMAN YATES: -- if there's an agreement without objection.

MR. MCADAM: Without objection.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Comes the Council Court and Respondent Dan Johnson, because it -- and today that's the only agreement that can be entered into. My understanding is that the -- that the Charging Committee no -- has no authority to enter into an agreement --

MS. KENT: Right.

CHAIRMAN YATES: -- that it would be to have the Council Court.

MS. KENT: And I just want to make sure -CHAIRMAN YATES: So that's a misstatement,
yes.

MS. KENT: -- when you've -- I'm sorry to interrupt, but when you vote on it, that that is clear that the document that you're voting on is not agreed to.

CHAIRMAN YATES: Without objection, it's been put into the record, Mr. Clerk, "Comes the

1 Council Court, " strike "Charging Committee by 2 counsel." 3 MR. OTT: So noted. 4 CHAIRMAN YATES: Second. Anybody? MULTIPLE COUNCIL MEMBERS: Second. 5 CHAIRMAN YATES: All right. All those in 6 7 favor, signify by saying aye. 8 (Vote.) 9 CHAIRMAN YATES: Those opposed? 10 That may have been complete overkill, but I 11 decided to do it anyway. 12 It's before us. Mr. Clerk, would you please 13 open the voting? 14 This is whether to accept the stipulation and 15 agreed order. It does take 13 votes to be accepted. 16 It takes 13 votes. Without objection, the voting is closing. 17 18 The voting is closed. 19 MR. OTT: There are 13 yes votes, six no 20 votes, and one not voting. The no votes, Council 21 Members James, Mulvihill, Kramer, Parker, Denton, 22 and Ackerson. 23 CHAIRMAN YATES: And the amended order and 24 stipulation passes and is accepted. 25 Seeing no other Council business before us,

STATE OF KENTUCKY 1 2 SS. 3 COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 4 5 I, Laura J. Kogut, a Notary Public within and 6 for the State at Large, my commission as such 7 expiring 25 July 2019, do hereby certify that the 8 foregoing hearing was taken before me at the time 9 and place stated and for the purpose in the caption 10 stated; that the hearing was reduced by me to shorthand writing; that the foregoing is a full, 11 12 true, and correct transcript of said hearing; that 13 the appearances were as stated in the caption. 14 WITNESS my hand this 7th day of November 2017. 15 16 17 Registered Merit Reporter 18 Certified Realtime Reporter Notary Public, State at Large 19 20 21 22 23 24 25